Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 4
Issue 2 Summer 1971

Article 4

Alien Crewmen: The United States Asylum Policy
Robert M. Rader

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rader, Robert M. (1971) "Alien Crewmen: The United States Asylum Policy," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 4: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol4/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Alien Crewmen:
The United States Asylum Policy
Robert M. Rader
I. INTRODUCTION

The American public and much of the free world were shocked during
the fall of 1970 to learn of the refusal of a United States Coast Guard
cutter to grant asylum to a would-be Lithuanian defector named Simas
Kudirka, a crewman aboard a Soviet fishing trawler in United States
territorial waters. The incident attracted enormous, perhaps disproportionate, attention from the State Department, Congress, and the President himself. While a request for asylum aboard a U.S. Coast Guard
cutter is not unique,' most requests for asylum by alien crewmen are
made ashore, after the ship has docked in an American port. The request
is then handled by immigration officials through a standing procedure
wholly outside State Department jurisidiction. Had Kudirka been channeled through this procedure, it is likely that his escape would have
proved equally futile but certainly not so notorious.
Aside from the unfortunate foreign policy implications, the facts
in both the Kudirka incident and the many more obscure incidents of
a refusal to grant asylum ashore point to a breach of the 1951 Geneva
2
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The United States be3
came a signatory to this treaty by the 1967 Protocol, which incorporates
4
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1. The Coast Guard has assisted Cuban refugees once they enter the Florida straits;
but during congressional investigation of the Kudirka incident, the Commandant could
recall only one instance of a request for aid when the escape was opposed by a Cuban
vessel in the near presence of a Coast Guard Cutter. A lifeboat carrying four Cuban
defectors was rammed by the Cuban ship off the Virginia coast; but the Coast Guard,
under orders from the State Department, did not interfere because the lifeboat was
outside U.S. territorial waters. Hearings on the Attempted Defection by Lithuanian
Seaman Simas Kudirka Before the Subcomm. on State Department Organization and
Foreign Operations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61,
78 (1970> [hereinafter cited as Defection Hearings].
2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees].
3. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 [hereinafter cited as Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees].
4. Id. Art. I, para. 1.
5. Supra note 2, Art. 38.
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deserting Soviet bloc vessels has been anything but generous and, regarding Kudirka, borders dangerously close to a violation of the Convention.
The Kudirka incident is thus instructive for purposes of applying
U.S. law and analyzing whether U.S. action conforms to obligations under
the 1951 Convention. It reveals the treatment which other Soviet bloc
crewmen might receive after desertion, upon being returned to their
ship by U.S. immigration officials.
A.

THE DEFECTION

On November 23, 1970, the Russian fishing trawler Sovetskaya Lilva
moored alongside the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Vigilant so that Soviet
and U.S. civilian representatives could discuss fishing rights off the
New England coast. The ships were within U.S. territorial waters
just off Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts. While the U.S. delegation was
aboard the Soviet vessel late that morning, a Soviet crewman, Simas
Kudirka, told Vigilant crewmen of his intent to desert ship during the
negotiations. The Vigilant wired the Coast Guard district office in Boston
for instructions. There were no standing orders regarding defectors applicable to the Coast Guard of the Boston District.6 The Boston station in
turn contacted the Chief of the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Staff in
Washington. The Chief was directed by the officer on duty at the Soviet
Union Affairs desk of the State Department to keep the State Department
informed and to do nothing to provoke a defection. The officer said,
however, that once Kudirka had jumped into the ocean "he could be
treated as a mariner in distress and rescued in accordance with the longstanding traditions of the sea and the Coast Guard statutory responsibility
as a search and rescue agency." 7 This message was then relayed back to
the Boston station.
While these communications were in progress, the Acting Commander
of the Boston station called his commanding officer, Rear Admiral William Ellis, to brief him on the possible defection. The Admiral suggested
that if the defector jumped overboard the Russians should be allowed
to pick him out of the sea. If the Russians did not go to his aid, the

6. Defection Hearings 20, 58, 61; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ATTEMPTED DEFECTION BY A
CREW MEMBER OF THE SOVETSKAYA LiTVA, Dec. 6, 1970 (memorandum prepared for the

President) [hereinafter cited as DEP'T OF STATE MEMORANDUM]. (Also cited in Defection
Hearings 234.)
7. DEP'T OF STATE MEMORANDUA 3. During subsequent congressional investigation, the
Coast Guard Commandant was reluctant to concede that the Coast Guard might assist
or rescue persons outside the traditional mariner in distress situation. Defection Hearings 79. The State Department later took the position that Kudirka should have been
treated as a mariner in distress. Id. at 23.

1971/Asylum Policy
Vigilant could rescue but should then return the defector.8 In large part
because of indecisive instructions from the State Department, this advice
finally hardened into an order.
In mid-afternoon, Simas Kudirka leaped from his ship onto the
deck of the Vigilant. Once aboard, Kudirka told Commander Eustis that
he would rather jump overboard and risk drowning than return voluntarily to his ship.9 Several civilians of the fishing industry on board for
negotiations pleaded with Commander Eustis to grant Kudirka asylum.
Two such men, purportedly having special knowledge of Russian defection policy, warned that Kudirka's life or freedom was gravely endangered by his request for asylum. 10 Eustis's initial order to return
Kudirka was nonetheless confirmed by Boston headquarters. At that point
the Soviet captain filed a written request for the return of Kudirka,
charging him with the theft of 3,000 rubles in ship's funds. Meanwhile,
Kudirka was hiding on the Vigilant, explaining the reasons for his defection. Kudirka said that he had been asked by the Russians years ago
to spy on fellow Lithuanians and that he had refused and suffered discrimination and ill-treatment ever since. He had been denied a passport
and mariner's certificate, both standard issues to Soviet vessel crewmen.
Also, he said, he had been relegated to menial jobs and denied civil
rights." Arguments by both the American and Russian commanders did
not convince Kudirka to return voluntarily. Faced with irrevocable
orders to return Kudirka and wishing to avoid the ignominy of ordering
American sailors to capture and surrender a defector, Commander Eustis
permitted several crewmen from the Sovetskaya to board the cutter and
retake Kudirka. These sailors seized Kudirka and, as onlookers would
later recall, inflicted a vicious beating. The defector and Russians were
lowered into an American launch, escorted by a few American sailors.
Upon their return to the Vigilant, the American sailors reported that
Kudirka was either unconscious or dead.

8. SUBCOMM. ON STATE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS, HOUSE
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON THE ATrEMPTED DEFECTION
BY LITHUANIAN SEAMAN SIMAS KUDIRKA 3 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as

DEFECTION REPORT].
9. Defection Hearings 153.
10. Defection Hearings 32, 153. Since the advice of a private citizen cannot be used as
a fair yardstick for measuring obligations under international law or for determining
the proper course of action in discharging duties according to U.S. foreign policy,
Captain Eustis was alerted to the need to check directly with State Department
officials. As it was, the State Department had been prematurely informed of Kudirka's
return hours before it occurred. DEP'T OF STATE MEMORANDUMt 4-5. See also N.Y. Times,
Nov. 29, 1970, at 84, col. 1.
11. Defection Hearings 154.
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B. THF AFTERMATH
The American public vehemently protested the official handling of
Kudirka's thwarted escape. Demonstrators lined the streets of numerous
large cities. 12 In reply to an official Coast Guard explanation that it had
not wanted to interrupt the "delicate international discussions" underway by granting asylum to Kudirka, the protesters complained that
American authorities were more interested in flounder than people. 13
None were more incredulous than the State Department, Congress,
and the President himself. The State Department declared the incident
to be without precedent.14 Although the Department could argue with
some strength that it had been left outside the decision making in the
incident because of misleading and infrequent communication with the
Coast Guard, it did not disclaim a violation of the 1951 Geneva Convention. 15 Pending a complete review of American policy regarding asylum,
the State Department issued interim regulations to be used by all
agencies not currently operating under standing procedure. 16 The Statc
Department explicitly recognized the Convention rules as the compelling
force within the interim regulations. These provided that any person
seeking asylum due to alleged persecution or fear of persecution was to
be interrogated immediately by the appropriate U.S. official to determine
his status as a bona fide refugee. With a special nod to the Kudirka incident, the regulations flatly stated that
[u]nder no circumstances should the person seeking asylum be arbitrarily or sumnmarily returned to foreign jurisdiction or control pending determination of his
status. Moreover, to the extent circumstances permit, persons seeking asylum should
1
be afforded every possible care and protection. 7

Finally, State Department spokesmen emphasized that the incident occurred as a result of bureaucratic bungling and not because of a change
in American policy regarding asylum.' 8
Congress was angered by the absence of standing instructions regarding
asylum aboard Coast Guard cutters and was understandably even more

12. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, at 1, col. 2.

13. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, at 84, col. 1.
14. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1970, at 2, col. 4. The State Department spokesman qualified
his statement by saying that a person with "clear grounds" for asylum had never bccn
denied sanctuary. Id. Earlier a spokesman had said that it was U.S. policy to grant
asylum to Communist-bloc refugees "who manage to make it into our hands." N.Y.
Times, No. 29, 1970, at 84, col. 4. The State Department maintained this position
throughout the congressional investigation. Defection Hearings 8.
15. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, at 84, col. 1.
16. DEP'T OF STATE MEIOPANDuM, ANNEX No. 11.

17. Id. at 4.
18. See note 14 supra.
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disturbed that the void had been filled, as it would learn later, by
Admiral Ellis, an officer "unencumbered by a knowledge or understanding of U.S. foreign policy on defection."'19 Nor could Congress understand why the State Department had failed to instruct the Coast Guard
to afford Kudirka temporary refuge until it had decided what final action
to take. 20 Several congressmen were equally displeased to hear that Russian officers had assumed a degree of command over21the Vigilant while
Kudirka was being routed from hiding and captured.
President Nixon called the incident "outrageous" and expressed deep
concern that foreign nations, particularly Iron Curtain countries, would
interpret the abortive defection to mean that the United States had
either abandoned its traditionally liberal policy of granting asylum or
22
had simply lost its moral fiber and resolve. The President ordered a
steady stream of reports broadcast over Voice of America assuring Eastern
23
Europe that America was still a haven for Iron Curtain escapees. One
report referred to an "open door" policy for refugees and stated that
24
policy to mean accommodation but not encouragement of defectors.
House be immediately inThe President also insisted that the White
25
formed of all future requests for asylum.
The Coast Guard, reacting to criticism of its role in the incident,
responded that it had acted in the best interests of the fishing rights
negotiations. 26 The Coast Guard also argued that in the absence of more
express authority empowering it to rescue aliens, its officers were correct
in staying within the Coast Guard tradition of rescuing only mariners in
distress. 27 Thus, if Kudirka had jumped into the water rather than
aboard the cutter, his chances for gaining asylum would have improved.
Additionally, the Coast Guard argued that Kudirka was properly returned
because he had been charged by his ship's captain of the theft of 8,000
rubles.

28

Whatever the merit of the Soviet claim, it is certain that neither

the Constitution nor statutory law authorizes a Coast Guard officer to
execute the extradition laws of the United States.

19. DEFECTION REPORT 2.
20. Defection Hearings 21.
21. Defection Hearings 43.
22. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1970, at 2, col. 4.

23. See Defection Hearings 121-50. Editorial broadcasts emphasized the traditional
liberality of the U.S. asylum policy; blame for the surrender of Kudirka was laid at
the feet of bungling bureaucrats. Id. at 106.
24. See Defection Hearings 142-43.

25. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1970, at 12, col. 1.
26. See note 13 supra.
27. Defection Hearings 78-79, 85-86.

28. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 3; Defection Hearings 244.
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II. INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN
GRANTING TERRITORIAL ASYLUM

A. THE RIGHT AND PROPRIETY UNDER CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

The principle of "territorial supremacy" means that each nation is
competent to accept aliens within its borders. Each state offers, therefore,
at least a provisional asylum for entering refugees. 29 Asylum itself is a
politically neutral condition and entails merely the grant of an indefinite
30
stay in a foreign country and active protection by the state of asylum.
But the moral connotation, through usage and discussion, has grown so
strong that there is immediately implied a refuge from persecution or
fear of persecution on the basis of political opinion or activity, religion,
31
race, or for other manifestly unjust reasons.
Just as territorial supremacy gives the right to accept refugees, so does
it contain the right to reject them. In the absence of treaty, states have
traditionally recognized both rights as equally absolute, 32 though, from
time to time, a number of countries have chosen to enact a constitutional
right of asylum.33 These provisions, affirmatively reacting to individual
persecution, inevitably conflict with national immigration laws, which
34
negatively react to mass persecution.
29. 1 L.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 675-77 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht).
30. A. PAVITHRAN, SUBSTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WESTERN & EASTERN 252 (1965);
J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (6th ed. 1967).

31. One authority defines asylum as a granting of admission because a person is being
persecuted for political or scientific activity or support of a national liberation movement. A. PAVITHRAN, supra note 30, at 252. More frequently, the reasons for which
asylum should or must be granted are stated in the context of provisions in resolutions
or conventions which prohibit rejection or expulsion of a refugee if doing so would
endanger his life. Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
is typical. It limits relief to persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
32. L. OPPENHEINI, supra note 29, at 677.
33. At least Italy, West Germany, France, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Communist China have, chiefly in the post-World War II era, enacted such provisions. See
L. OPP-NEisM, supra note 29, at 677; C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (P. Corbett transl. 1957); W. TUNG, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN AN ORGANIZING WORLD 215 (1968).
34. See Kirchheimer, Asylum, 53 A,,. POL. Sd. REV. 985, 989-990 (1959); C. DE
VIssCHER, supra note 33, at 183. Even the World War II European refugee experience
has not spurred that continent into agreeing upon a mass exodus asylum policy of
mutual cooperation. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 did
not deal with either individual or mass asylum problems, Other multilateral treaties
have also failed to face this problem squarely. The International Refugee Organization,
a postwar organ of the United Nations, was able, however, to resettle from western
Europe to overseas countries 1.4 million persons, most of whom were refugees from communist nations and who were unwilling to be repatriated. 50 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL.
678 (1964). Nevertheless, the prewar experience shows that nations bordering upon
"cataclysmic social and political upheavals" will not, generally speaking, grant even
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In earlier days, asylum was an important reform in putting an end to
extradition for political crimes;3 5 the pursuing government had an interest in recovering the political criminal because his opposition and the
ideas which he physically embodied were a threat to the state. The Cold
War refugee, however, is no longer political but social; and the pursuing
state may regret his escape only for its momentary, dramatized propaganda value. Therefore, the earlier moral commitment to provide asylum
required narrowing if it were not to shed hope so diffusely that the
freer states offering asylum would be overwhelmed by numbers and then
36
be unable or unwilling to help any at all.

B.

NARROWING THE SCOPE AND DEFINING THE OBLIGATION

TO GRANT ASYLUM

Large masses of refugees present such tremendous problems of surveillance, police protection, care and welfare, and national assimilation that
no nation has been willing to state in advance by convention a determination to meet any burden a war or natural catastrophe might bring. These
problems necessarily fall upon international organizations, such as the
International Refugee Organization, to which the wealthier countries
make voluntary contributions. A supplemental route is emergency
national legislation, in which the United States has been a postwar leader,
designed to ease the crowding in overseas refugee camps by admitting a
fair proportion into the foreign state either as immigrants or as nonimmigrants given temporary refuge.
A great deal of international legislation has been devoted to the status
and rights of the refugee once granted asylum. Foremost among these
efforts has been the challenge of protecting enemies of the state of
origin from the persecution they would encounter if repatriated intemporary asylum to large numbers of refugees. Kirchheimer, supra, at 994. The Swiss
did, however, admit French and German refugees during the prewar and war years
if they were in imminent personal danger. Id. at 989 n. 7.
35. V. MAHAJAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (4th ed. 1963).
36. See C. DE VisscHER, supra note 33, at 182. But see L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at
678, where the author argues that in the absence of an international law which binds
nations to respect the human rights of their own nationals, the right of refugees to be
granted asylum should be recognized and "the sanctity of human life should prevail over
the inconvenience - economic and other - resulting from the obligatory administration
of large numbers of persecuted refugees." Id. Aside from the problem of defining a
political refugee during times when political revolution often precipitates, accompanies,
or causes economic disaster (or vice-versa), Lauterpacht's ambitious proposal imposes
an enormous logistical challenge, even with considerable international cooperation. The
State Department estimated there were 11 million bona fide political or religious
refugees as of 1966. It is anticipated that this number will increase as nationalist
struggles for self-determination, religious wars, and the steady exodus from communist
nations continues. 55 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 751 (1966).
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voluntarily. Historically, the policy may be traced to the refuge granted
Russian and Armenian refugees by European countries following World
War I under the direction of the League of Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. The participating nations reached a non-binding accord
for mutual cooperation which provided in part that properly admitted
refugees should not be expelled if they were unable "to enter a neighboring country in a regular manner." 37 The recommendation was motivated
by a regard for the security of refuge rather than by fear of possible persecution elsewhere.
Similarly, the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of
Refugees 38 bound signatories against expulsion or non-admittance at
the frontier (commonly called "refoulment") of refugees authorized to
reside within the state, except for reasons of national security or public
order. But the 1933 Convention went further than the earlier accord
since it also imposed an absolute duty upon signatories to accept refugees
at the border of their nations of origin.39 This provision, like the old
accord, primarily assured the refugee a nation of refuge, surely his first
concern; but it also guaranteed protection for persons who had fallen
out of favor with the regime. Subsequently, the 1938 Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany 40 also offered
asylum to German refugees not having "in law or fact" 41 the protection
of the German government and forbade refoulment of refugee residents
except for reasons of national security or public order.
In recent years efforts have been made to codify and regularize the international rules regarding the admittance or rejection of refugees. In
1950, l'Institut de Droit International, meeting in Bath, produced certain
Resolutions Relating to Asylum. in Public International Law. 42 The
territorial asylum provisions are relevant chiefly to large refugee masses,
and the articles on territorial asylum are very inconclusive on the matter
of refoulment. Article 2 applies a uniform rule in anticipating both
situations in which the state may be able to expel a refugee and situations
in which "expulsion is rendered impossible by the refusal of other states
to receive him." This consideration of the non-refoulment principle respects the primary function of the principle, security of refuge, but gives
only weak support to the secondary function of non-refoulment, protec-

37. Arrangement Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugee,
done June 30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 53 (1929).
38. Done Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199 (1936).
39. Id. Art. 3.

40. Done Feb. 10, 1938, 192 L.N.T.S. 59 (1938).
41. Id. Art. 1 (1) (a).
42. Institute of International Law, Resolutions Relating to Asylum in Public
International Law, 2 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 388 (Bath
Session 1950) [hereinafter cited as Resolutions Relating to Asylum].
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tion of the individual from persecution or recrimination by his own
government.
As part of its continuing effort to elevate all basic human rights and
freedoms to the level of international recognition and enforcement, the
United Nations has been instrumental in codifying the international law
of asylum. Most of its effort, too, has been directed to the benefit of the
mass refugee and not to the isolated political dissenter, even though both
are covered by many of the same provisions.4 3 The landmark achievement under U.N. tutelage has been the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees.4 4 The United States did not sign the 1951 Conven-

43. The U.N. sponsored International Refugee Organization resettled more than one
million Eastern Europeans overseas after World War I. Although the principle of
non-refoulement was not explicity a part of the IRO Constitution, the principle of
voluntary return and the definition of refugee to include those fearing persecution
gave the rule practical effect. The Annex defines war refugees within its concern as
(1) victims of the Axis regimes and regimes assisting them; (2) Spanish Republicans;
(3) persons considered refugees before World War II because of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality or political opinion; (4) anyone who fled his country of
nationality or former residence as a result of events after war broke out and is unwilling
or unable to avail himself of the protection of his former government; (5) persons of
Jewish ancestry, foreigners, and stateless persons formerly residing in Austria or
Germany who were in those countries at war's end only because of Nazi persecution,
if they had not yet firmly resettled therein; and (6) war orphans outside their country
of origin. All categories except (5) require that the person be outside the country of
nationality or habitual residence. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, done Dec. 15, 1946, Annex 1, T.IA.S. No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 (1948}.
44. Done, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1954).
45. During Senate hearings on the 1967 Protocol, the State Department assigned this
omission to orientation of the Convention to postwar Europe. The State Department
claimed that the United States then saw the 1951 Convention as an effort to define
rights of the European refugee overflow already in countries of asylum directly after
World War II. Since rights stated under the Convention were already provided here by
domestic law or practice, and the United States was already committed to a number of
postwar emergency relief programs for refugees, failure to accede to the 1951 Convention did not pose any real problems on the human or diplomatic level. But, as the
spokesman implied, harmonizing the non-refoulment provisions with latter day deportation law would have been difficult (if not impossible) had each been literally applied.
SENATE

CO1,1Mi. ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS,

PROTOCOL RELATING TO

REFUGEES,

S.

EXEC.

REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 14].
46. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 3.
47. The chief purpose of the 1967 Protocol was to redefine "refugee" to include
refugees other than those displaced by World War II and the subsequent Communist
takeover of eastern Europe. Signatories to the Protocol presently recognize "refugee" to
include (1) persons recognized as refugees by earlier agreements for the protection
of refugees which were sponsored by the League of Nations, or (2) persons outside the
country of their nationality and unable or unwilling to rely upon the protection of
their government, owing to well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or (3) stateless persons outside the country of their last habitual residence who fear similar
persecution and are unwilling or unable to return. E.g., Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees. A person may forfeit his status as a refugee if he (1) avails himself
of the protection of the country of his nationality; (2) voluntarily reacquires lost
nationality; (3) acquires new nationality from a different nation whose protection he
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tion4 5 but did accede to the 1967 Protocol, 46 which incorporates, with a
few amendments, the 1951 provisions in their entirety. 47 The Convention
imposes no duty to accept refugees. 48 However, Article 33 limits the
right of a signatory to expel or return a refugee, whether the refugee
entered the country lawfully40 or unlawfully ° and prohibits refoulment
to the frontiers of the territory in which his life or freedom would be
threatened. 51
Although the signatories to the 1951 Convention have been slow in

enjoys; (4) voluntarily emmigrates to the country he left out of fear of persecution;
(5) can no longer validly assert a fear of persecution in the country he left. Id. Article
1 (c) (l>-(5). Nor does the Convention protect persons whom the asylum state has declared to have rights and obligations attached to nationality, even though the person
cannot or has not achieved the status of citizen or national. Id. Article 1 (E). Persons
strongly suspected of war crimes, crimes against peace, or crimes against humanity,
persons committing a serious non-political crime outside the asylum state prior to admission, and persons committing acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations are likewise denied coverage. Id. Article 1 (1).
48. The State Department assured the Senate that "there is nothing in [the] protocol
which implies [a duty] or puts any pressure on any contracting state to accept additional refugees as immigrants." S. REP. No. 14, at 10, 19 (emphasis added).
49. Article 32 governs the treatment of lawful entries. It provides for the expulsion of
refugees only upon traditional grounds of national security or public order. Significantly, summary expulsion is forbidden except in compelling instances of national security.
Otherwise, the state of asylum must follow some administrative or judicial procedure
consistent with due process. If he loses, the refugee must still be allowed a reasonable
period to seek legal admission to another country.
50. Article 31 governs the treatment of unlawful entries. If a refugee enters or is
present in a country illegally, state authorities may not impose a penalty for such
illegality if the refugee can satisfy local officials that he came directly from a territory
in which his life or freedom was threatened. Article 31, unlike Article 32, contains no
procedural safeguards, although the entrant must show good cause for the
illegal entry or presence, which implies that he be given at the very least a hearing
at which he may present evidence of his hardship. If the entrant fails to convince
the authorities on any point, he must be granted a reasonable period and all necessary
help in obtaining admission elsewhere prior to deportation.
51. The State Department, without elaboration, strongly hinted that the United
States immigration law was consistent on its face with the Protocol but that U.S. practice in granting a stay or suspension of deportation would require change. During
Senate hearings a spokesman commented:
[W]hile the concept of guaranteeing safe and humane asylum is the most important
element of the Protocol, accession does not in any sense commit the Contracting
State to enlarge its immigration measures for refugees ....
The deportation provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, with limited exceptions, are consistent with this concept. The Attorney General will be able to administer such
provisions in conformity with the Protocol, without amendment of the Act.
S. REP. No. 14, at 6.
The spokesman added that the language of § 243 (h) of the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 214, was in conflict with Article 33. That section authorized the
Attorney General to grant a stay of deportation of any alien to any country "in which
in his opinion the alien would be subjected to physical persecution." That language
was amended by § 11 (f) of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, 79 Stat. 918,
so that the new test for persecution is "persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §1253 (Supp. V 1969).
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ratifying the Protocol, 52 wide acceptance of the non-refoulment rules
has been noted in practice, to the extent that national self-restraint may
allow the non-refoulment principle to become a customary rule of international law, at least among non-totalitarian states. 53 One source
argues that short of a yet unrecognized duty to grant asylum, there is
room for recognizing a "temporary, provisional claim to short-term
54
asylum" until permanent residence is established elsewhere.
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 55 also
lends some support to the recognition of non-refoulment as conventional
international law. The Convention contains no equivalent of Article 33.
The Final Act of the Convention explains the omission as an opinion
of the Conference that Article 33 is an expression of "the generally accepted principle" of non-refoulment, so that the Conference found it
unnecessary to include its equivalent in the 1954 Convention. 56 However,
it is doubtful that the expression is even binding on the signatories,
since it is contained in the Final Act instead of the body of the Con57
vention.
Two resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly bear heavily
on the status of the non-refoulment rule as conventional international
law. While resolutions of the General Assembly are in no sense legally
binding upon any nation, they surely may be observed voluntarily. And
they do show underlying sympathy and moral support for principles
which the voting members presumably hope to develop into binding
conventional law at a later, more propitious date.
The first of these resolutions passed was the Universal Declaration of

52. At the time the Protocol was submitted to the Senate for approval, only 18 of the
53 signatories to the 1951 Convention had ratified the Protocol and no non-signatory
had ratified it.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF Tm
THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES,

UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

90th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (Star

Print 1968).
53. Kirchheimer, supra note 34, at 1000; Weis, Human Rights and Refugees, 45
INTERPRETER RELEASES 75 (1968). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees may, on the other hand, be regarded as a codification of what states regard as
their preexisting obligations and rights under conventional international law. Id. at
79-80.
54. J. STARKE, supra note 30, at 310-11.
55. Done, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (1960).
56. See N. ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS:
ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION

123-24 (1955).

57. Id. at 124. Accord, Grahl-Madsen, The European Tradition of Asylum and the
Development of Refugee Law, 1966 J. OF PxAcE RESEARCH 284 n. 47. Another part of
the Final Act implicitly recognizes the non-refoulment principle. If a nation finds the
reasons for which a person has voluntarily renounced the protection of the state of
which he was a national are valid, the nation is to consider sympathetically the possibility of treating such person as a stateless person under the Convention. This finding
presumably carries with it a decision not to return the person to his former homeland.
58. G. A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. No. A/789 at 70 (1948).
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Human Rights, 58 enacted at the end of the 1948 session. Article 14 states

that everyone "has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution," except persons sought regarding prosecutions
"genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations." 59 It also provides
that the persecuting state may not use its extradition procedures to
thwart an attempt at asylum 60 or otherwise resort to retributive sanctions in an attempt to penalize or frustrate an attempt to gain asylum,
whether before, during, or after asylum is sought. In conjunction with
this premise, Article 13 provides in part for freedom to leave any
country, including one's homeland, and to return to one's homeland.01
However, to tell a tyrant in one breath that he must not persecute on
account of politics or religion and tell him in the next that if he does,
he must allow the tormented to escape, is ludicrous and shallow. 02 The
incongruity would be easier to accept, and some nobility might be restored, if the Article 14 obligation were bilateral so as to include some
measure of responsibility on the part of the asylum state in helping the
refugee seek and enjoy his asylum.
Later, the Human Rights Commission, resolving to amplify the right
declared by Article 14, produced a resolution on a Declaration of Territorial Asylum. 63 Article 1 limits the scope of the Declaration to persons
entitled to seek and enjoy asylum according to Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Article 1 also leaves that determination
and other decisions regarding the grounds for granting asylum with the
discretion of the asylum state. While Article 3 (1) states the Declaration's non-refoulment principle, Article 3 (2) permits exceptions to the
non-refoulment rule for reasons of national security or safeguarding the
population, as in instances of mass immigration. The Declaration at59. This was the language of Article 14 as submitted to the General Assembly by the
Third Committee. The text which the Third Committee considered was drafted a year
earlier by the Commission of Human Rights, a unit of the Economic and Social
Council. U.N. GAOR, Third Comm., Annexes at 128, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/400/Rev. 1
(1948). The earlier draft of Article 14 was much more liberal. It guaranteed the right

to seek and be granted asylum from persecution. 7 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 2,at 8, U.N.

Doc. E/CN.4/95 (1948). The British delegate to the Third Committee thought that

the wording of Article 14 as submitted interfered with national immigration laws. An
amendment was offered and adopted, with strong United States encouragement, to

restrict the right to enjoyment of asylum once granted. U.N. GAOR, Third Comm.,

Annexes at 24, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/285/Rev. 1 (1948).
60. See 3 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm. 329-31 (1948).
61. A Soviet proposal to limit the right in accordance with the procedure laid down
by municipal law failed. See 3 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm., Annexes 23, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/284/Rev. 1 (1948).
62. Professor Lauterpacht has been quoted as calling Article 14 "artificial to the
point of flippancy." See Weis, supra note 53, at 72.
63. GA. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). See
Weis, supra note 53, at 73.
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tempts to compensate for this concession to national sovereignty in two
ways. Article 2 (2) suggests that nations should consider the propriety
of joint or individual efforts in lightening the immigration load of an
overburdened state of asylum. Also, Article 3 (3) directs the asylum state
to consider the possibility of offering provisional asylum and exit to
a nonhostile country in the event the asylum state should choose not to
follow the non-refoulment rule of Article 3 (1).
The Declaration and 1951 Convention added together retreat from
earlier, stricter frontier non-refoulment rules. Article 3 of the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, 6 4 for example,
absolutely prohibited refoulment at the frontier of the refugee's country
of origin.

C.

THE NON-REFOULMENT PRINCIPLE AND DESERTING ALIEN SEAMEN

None of the non-refoulment rules stated in the United Nations resolutions or conventions deal specifically with those who desert their ships.
However, a number of resolutions of l'Institut de Droit International
discuss asylum aboard warships extraterritorially. These may be analytically compared to the policy of granting territorial asylum because the
resolutions refer to issues of persecution and political activity equally
relevant to territorial asylum.
The earliest of these was the adoption during the Hague session of
1898 of certain Regulations Concerning the Legal Status of Ships and
Their Crews in Foreign Ports. 65 Article 19 puts all ship deserters in the
same class as criminal military deserters and refugees; ship commanders
were forbidden to grant asylum to all three groups. The Regulations apparently did not foresee a situation in which desertion from a merchant
marine vessel might itself be a political act or arise from political activity,
because they lay down no guidelines for determining the status of political refugees and only enjoin the ship to maintain strict impartiality
regardng the political dispute. If the ship commander wrongly received a
refugee, however, Article 21 provided that force could not be used for
his recapture and resort had to be made to extradition procedures.
In 1928 l'Institut de Droit International maintained this lack of distinction between political refugees and other ship deserters. Article 21
of the Regulations Governing Ships and Their Crews in Foreign Ports

64. Done, Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199 (1936).
65. Institute of International Law, Regulations Concerning the Legal Status of Ships
and Their Crews in Foreign Ports, 17 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 273 (1898), cited in DIvIsIoN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REsOLUIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF

(J. Scott, ed. and transl. 1916).
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in Peacetime 60 also prohibited a ship commander in a foreign port from
granting asylum to ship deserters. Similarly, the commander was ordered
to maintain strict neutrality, but this time the regulations added that
the refugee must clearly establish the political nature of his refugee
status. 67 Again, no standards were laid down.

The Resolutions Relating to Asylum in Public International Law,0 8
enacted by the Bath Session of the l'Institut de Droit International in
1950, offer some help. Articles 3 and 4 recognize a right to receive refugees
aboard ships in foreign ports in circumstances of civil strife or in other
instances in which local authority cannot guarantee the protection of the
persons seeking asylum. While these resolutions deal with the scope of
the extraterritorial asylum right rather than the non-refoulment duty,
the same practical consequences follow. In either instance the refugee has
committed himself and, having shown his hand, he is at the mercy of
his government upon his return.
At least one bilateral treaty has in fact envisioned ship desertion as
an expression of political dissent brought on by unjust persecution or a
realistic fear of such persecution. The Consular Convention Between the
United Kingdom and Norway69 provides that the signatories have a duty
in aiding the apprehension of ship deserters but that there is no duty
to surrender the seamen if there is reasonable ground for believing his
life or liberty would be endangered by reason of racial, religious, national,
or political persecution 7° in any country where the vessel is likely to go.
D.

THE CONCEPTUAL INADEQUACY OF STANDARDS GOVERNING
A GRANT OF ASYLUM

The earlier rules regarding a grant of extraterritorial asylum are
conceptually inadequate for measuring the non-refoulment duty in
the age of the Cold War. Even the later Conventions themselves seem tied
to the concept of shifting population masses, usually ethnically or
nationally homogeneous, which move abruptly following natural catastrophe, war, or the threat of war. They seem apart from the incident involving Simas Kudirka, who strikes one more as a defector than a refugee.
"Defector" seems the best way to describe any person whose flight from
the control of his government or from a foreign power controlling his
government unlawfully is a political dissent from the government; how66. Institute of International Law, Regulations Governing Ships and Their Crews
in Foreign Ports in Peacetime, 34 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
736 (1928).
67. Id. at 743.
68. Resolutions Relating to Asylum, supra note 42.
69. Done Feb. 22, 1951, 326 U.N.T.S. 209 (1959).
70. Id. Art. 26 (5) (a), (b) (ii).
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ever, no significant extrinsic circumstance sets the escaping person apart
from his countrymen. A refugee, on the other hand, is a person who has
evoked a "personalized hostile reaction" 71 from his government or a part
of the community the government is powerless to control. The lone defector, though, whose hardships under a normalized though wholly unlawful foreign subjugaton are indistinct from his compatriots, would not
be a refugee so as to fall under the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees.7 2 Certainly it could not have been the intention of
those who drafted the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor
of its signatories to grant immediate, unconditional right of asylum to
the entire population of any country unlawfully or tyrannically governed. 73 The United States therefore regards the assessment of the status
74
of each escapee under the 1951 Convention as an ad hoc judgment.
The Department of State declined to decide the status of Simas Kudirka
after the incident had ended; but on the basis of Kudirka's conversation
aboard the Vigilant, the element of persecution appears missing, although
the issue is by no means certain. Kudirka, no doubt under crushing pressures and anxiety about his surrender, was able for the most part to relate in only a vague manner what was later recounted by civilian onlookers as discrimination and a denial of civil rights. Concretely speaking,
Kudirka claimed to have been denied job advancement and certain
papers normally issued to Soviet vessel crewmen. This ill-treatment,
while perhaps a rung above harrassment, is less than the level of persecution the United States has required for refugees to avoid refoulment in
the administration of immigration laws.75 At least regarding matters
extrinsic to his escape, Kudirka would not have qualified as a refugee
under the 1951 Convention.
The vicious attack upon Kudirka on board the Vigilant presents
another difficult question, namely, whether the act of defection may
sometimes qualify as a "political opinion" within the meaning of Article 1
of the 1951 Convention. If so, and the defector can satisfy the asylum
state that he would be punished for his defection if returned, it could
be reasonably argued that refoulment would result in persecution for

71. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
72. Article 1 clearly provides that in order to qualify as a refugee the cause for
leaving one's country originally must have been persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion. It is not enough that the defector leaves because of
a political opinion formed as to unsatisfactory conditions in his country; an element
of individualized persecution is required to achieve refugee status.
73. Again referring to the language of Article 1, the test is not whether a person
owes or feels allegiance to his government, but whether he has its protection.
74. See DEP'T OF STATE MEMORANDUM, Annex 12 at 3.
75. See note 51 supra.
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political opinion and, hence, would be prohibited by Article 833. 7 True,
the argument is sheer bootstrap logic, but that does not change political
realities; severe recriminations will probably occur if the defector is surrendered, as they did so clearly in the Kudirka incident.
Here an important distinction must be made between humanitarian
policy and liability under the Convention. The definition of refugee in
Article 1 implicitly rejects the notion that the mere defection or escape
itself should provide a basis for pleading the non-refoulment rule. It
78
77
states that refugees are persons outside the country of their nationality.
Clearly, the parties wished to restrict coverage to individuals whose fear
of persecution was based upon something aside from their mere escape
or absence from their homeland. Hopefully, nations would give sympathetic consideration to defectors lacking refugee status by making a
realistic estimate of political conditions in the defector's homeland, even
though not required by the 1951 Convention to do so.
In any event, the determination of refugee status involves "complex
factual and legal considerations." 79 The State Department reached the
conclusion in its study of the Kudirka incident that Article 83 must be
interpreted to mean that provisional asylum will be granted during the
period of official assessment; and accordingly it reported that for breach
of this implied duty the United States may have violated Article 33.80
The State Department did not mention the possibility that Article 33
prohibits only refoulment in the nature of expulsion and does not re-

76. Speaking in a slightly different context on the right to offer asylum, one
authority says:

Accomplishing a duty of humanity, the State in whose territory the refugees are
cannot be bound to impose repatriation when, fully informed on the real situation in their homeland and being neither war criminals nor traitors to their country, they persistently refuse to return. To hand them over to governments which
have nothing against them but their want of attachment to the regime would be
to betray the principles of tolerance that are the foundations of political asylum.
C. DE VIssCER, supra note 33, at 183.

-

77. "Country" in the Article 1 sense should be interpreted as dependent upon jurisdiction and control rather than legal fictions sometimes recognized by international
law. In the Kudirka incident, for example, U.S. Coast Guard and civilian officials
learned of the crewman's desire to defect while they were on board the Soviet trawler
during negotiations. Defection Hearings 53. It is unclear what status a publicly owned
trawler enjoys in foreign waters. Possibly it is not regarded as part of the territory.
See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at 856; C. FENWICK, INTERNATONAL LAw 320 (3d
rev. ed. 1948).
78. The 1951 Convention added another qualification: the person must be outside
the country as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951, the purpose being
to limit the Convention to persons displaced by the turmoil of World War and the subsequent Communist takeover in Eastern Europe. The 1967 Protocol removed the time
limitation but left intact the requirement that the person be outside the country of
origin.
79. DEP'T OF STATE MEMORANDUM Annex 11 at 3.

80. Id. Annex 12 at 3.
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quire admittance under any circumstances. 8 ' Article 33 itself forbids only
that states "expel or return" a refugee "in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened."
Against this literalism, however, there is the argument that non-refoulment is a principle historically understood to include a limited right of
admission, as seen in the 1933 Convention Regarding the International
Status of Refugees.8 2 Further, it may be presumed that in most cases, as in
the Kudirka incident, the fleeing refugee will enter a territory illegally
and will then come under Article 31, dealing with refugees illegally within
the country, and, incidentally, Article 33. It is illogical from the viewpoint
of the purpose of Article 33 in preventing persecution to distinguish
persons who have reached the border from those who gained illegal
entry. In each instance, the asylum state has the power to make the
determination of refugee status, as defined under Article 1, as well as the
Article 33 determination of whether his life or freedom would be imperiled. A grant of provisional asylum to all who request it, whether
within or without the country, whether finally determined a refugee or
not, would satisfy the humanitarian duty unstated by the 1951 Convention and would implement the right of persons to seek asylum under
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
There is an additional ground for imposing liability for Iron Curtain
defectors under Article 33 that lies outside the Convention. Following
the Kudirka incident, the United States embarked on a massive effort
to inform Iron Curtain countries by means of Voice of America that its
83
traditionally liberal asylum policy would be honored in the future.
The President himself promised against recurrence of the Kudirka
tragedy.84 The broadcasts said in effect that the United States would
not decline asylum to any Iron Curtain escapee. Rarely was the promise
qualified even to the extent of commenting that the United States did
not encourage defections but that aid would be offered if asylum were
sought.8 Under such circumstances, even lacking adverse reliance, it may
81. But see testimony of State Department spokesman before congressional hearings,
supra note 48. The spokesman said that there was no duty to accept immigrants; but

that apparently still leaves room under U.S. immigration law for acceptance of refugees
given non-immigrant status.

82. Done Oct. 28, 1933, Article 3, 159 L.N.T.S. 199 (1936).
83. See notes 23 and 24 supra. A complete record of the relevant overseas broadcasts
by Voice of America may be found in Defection Hearings 121-50.
84. The President remarked:
I was, as an American, outraged and shocked that this could happen. I can
assure you it will never happen again. The United States of America for 190 years
has had a proud tradition of providing opportunities for refugees, and guarantee-

ing their safety. And we are going to meet that traditon. (emphasis in original).
Voice of Amerca, Taped Radio Broadcast (Dec. 13, 1970), cited in Defection Hearings
149.
85. See Voice of America, U.S. Information Agency, Radio Broadcast (Dec. 1, 1970
cited in Defection Hearings 143.
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be that the United States would be estopped from denying Iron Curtain
defectors refugee status.86 The estoppel principle acts as a stabilizing
force within international law and prevents inequities in circumstances
as this in which reliance is notorious.8s
The last and most nettlesome problem posed by the non-refoulment
rule in international law is enforcement. Traditionally, injury suffered
by an individual by a breach of international treaty law is a grievance
that must be taken up by the sovereign; the national has no standing before an international tribunal.8 8 Article 33, the non-refoulment rule of the
1951 Convention, introduces an obvious obstacle in the normal procedure for bringing international claims: the rule anticipates that the
sovereign will not protect but will in fact persecute the injured national.
Even if by some remarkable quirk the sovereign did bring an action before the International Court of Justice, s9 the national would thereby
86. The principle achieved at least passing recognition during the early 1950's when
our program for assisting Iron Curtain escapees was undergoing evaluation. The
President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization concluded that the United
States had a "special responsibility" and "special interest" in these people:
At least some of them have come because our propaganda lured them. If sacrifice
earns the right to liberty, they have earned it. We cannot turn them away anl
expect those still behind the Iron Curtain to believe us ever again.
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COAM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION: WHOM
WELCOME 59 (1953).
One federal court has conceded that deportation

WE SI II

under U.S.
immigration law may be barred under the principle of estoppel, if there is reliance
upon a misleading statement or position of the government. Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, 305
F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1962).
87. See Note, The Effect of Unilateral State Acts in International Law, 2 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L

L. & POL. 333. (1969).

88. See Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 8. There is a crucial difference between the
individual's power to sue and his rights and duties created by international treaty,
custom, or convention. Lauterpacht has noted the very crucial distinction
between procedural capacity before an international tribunal and status of a subject
of international law: "The two questions are not synonymous. The existence of a right
and the power to assert it by judicial process are not identical." H. LAUTERPAC11T,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950). The Nuremburg trials, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms are examples of the latter. For further discussion, see Udochi,
The Individual as a Subject of International Rights and Duties, 2 COLUI. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 14 (1963-; C. NORGAARD, THE POSTmON OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-98 (1962).
89. Article 38 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides for
judicial settlement:
Any dispute between parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or
application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the
dispute.
The 1967 Protocol has a similar provision. This is an acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(1) of the Charter of the International Court of Justice, and
would not be in any way restricted by the Connally Amendment, by which the United
States reserves the right to refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of the court if the
matter lies within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. (This determination
is to be made by the United States, and not the I.C.J.) See S. ExEc. REP. No. 14,
at 11-12, 18.
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automatically forfeit status as a refugee under the 1951 Convention for
having solicited the protection of his government. 90 To allow the individual injured to bring an action would be no solution since by hypothesis he has effectively lost his freedom upon return to his homeland.
To the extent that unlawful refoulment detracts from the purpose of
the 1951 Convention and possibly may impose a future duty of care
upon another contracting party, nonviolating parties to the 1951 Convention would seem to have a justiciable interest in the protection of the
asylum rights of the refouled national. Otherwise, it would be hard to
imagine how a "dispute" over the interpretation and application of
the Convention would occur with respect to rules prohibiting refoulment.
Alternatively, it might be suggested that the United Nations, dearly an
international personality, 91 having sponsored the 1951 Convention and
recommended its accession by resolution, 92 has the right to litigate and
defend the unprotected asylum rights of world refugees. An additional
protocol might also be desirable to insure possible participation by the
United Nations in such disputes. Whatever the remedy, the enormous
effort on behalf of refugees has produced substantial rights which should
not lapse because of procedural deficiencies within the international
system of justice.
Ill. AMERICAN POLICY IN GRANTING ASYLUM

A.

GRANTING ASYLUM EXTRATERRITORIALLY

Although the United States has been cautious in offering extraterritorial asylum, there is overwhelming support in our diplomatic history
for such a grant when the life of a refugee or escapee is arbitrarily
threatened, whether by his own government, a political faction, or uncontrolled mob violence. Whether the limits of the American policy are
93

self-imposed or are restraints set by conventional international law,

the United States practice of granting asylum extraterritorially when
personal danger threatens the requesting refugee has been a minimal
standard for many nations throughout the years and, as such, has be-

90. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1 (c> (1).
91. The United Nations "is a subject of international law and capable of possessing
international rights and duties, and . . . has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing
international claims." Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.CJ. 174, 179.
92. Res. 538 (VI) (A), 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20 at 35, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1951-52).
93. The State Department maintains that diplomatic asylum, for instance, is possible
only because of the inviolability of such premises and not because of any conventional
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come integrated into numerous conventions defining the rights and obligations of nations in accepting or rejecting refugees territorially. The
American history of extraterritorial asylum thus guides one toward an
understanding of our obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention.
1. Diplomatic Asylum
The privilege of granting asylum within a foreign embassy or consulate
as a colorable right grew out of the early fiction that diplomatic legations are outside the domestic jurisdiction of the host nation. Local
administrative authority was deemed barred from these premises, at least
as far as was necessary to protect the inviolability of the persons and
state papers of the legation. 94 Gradually, the privilege expanded until
it became practical by usage and mutually desirable to afford protection
to political figures out of favor with the present regime. In later instances
this privilege came to bless less prominent men, 95 so that in critical
periods of internal revolt, legations have given protection to large masses
of ordinary citizenry hardly distinguished by political zeal but still
without adequate protection from their own government. 96
Sometimes called "humanitarian intervention" by diplomacy because
of its extraterritorial nature, 97 the authorities have commented favorably
upon the United States policy of granting diplomatic asylum in dire circumstances. According to Hackworth, the United States policy is that
such refuge should never be granted, or if granted be continued, in opposition to the demands of an existing local government that is able and willing to
guarantee to the refugee the customary safeguards of its legal institutions. It is

international law regarding asylum. If diplomatic premises are "inviolable", though,
it is difficult to justify restraint in granting asylum extraterritorially as based on a
respect for foreign sovereignty rather than a sense of international comity. In one correspondence Secretary of State Hughes likewise refused in defending the ipso facto
quality of United States diplomatic asylum to take shelter in international custom. The
grant of temporary asylum, he said, "is based on the theory that disorderly conditions
productive of mob violence, for example, have so impaired the power of disposition of
local authorities to administer justice as to render inapplicable for the time being the
(territorial sovereignty) principle." Telegram from the Sec'y of State to the Ambassador

in Chile [1925], 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 4854 (1925).
94. See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at 795-96.

95. See Kirchheimer, supra note 34, at 1003.
96. During the Spanish Civil War, for example, well over ten thousand refugees
poured into various diplomatic premises in Madrid. W. TUNG, supra note 33, at 217 n.
86.
97. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at 304. Lauterpacht elsewhere declares the right
of humanitarian intervention-which he offers only as an analogy to diplomatic asylum
- to exist only "when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution
of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock
the conscience of mankind." Id. at 312. He finds support for this theory within the
Charter of the United Nations despite the Charter rule against intervention in matters
of domestic jurisdiction. Id. at 313.
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only when the local government has become unable to assure the safety of the
refugee and his life is consequently endangered through mob violence or other
lawlessness that protection may be granted.98

This usage proceeds out of a humanitarian sense rather than observance
of the international law of extraterritorial asylum, which the United
States does not recognize. 99 Even in South American nations, which frequently accord the privilege among themselves, the principle of diplomatic asylum evolved more from humanitarian impulse and expediency
than from a respect for law.100 Moreover, there is cause to believe that
there are "practical variations" in the United States policy, so that a
more lenient attitude toward asylum exists in those American legations
established in countries which themselves have a tolerant policy toward
diplomatic asylum.101
Instances of diplomatic asylum in United States legations are by no
means isolated, 0 2 but mention of a few will adequately demonstrate the
perimeters of American policy. In 1925 a junta rebellion occurred in
Chile, which left several of the old regime in fear of losing their lives
by mob violence. The Secretary of State advised the American embassy
that temporary asylum might be offered if the threat of mob violence became so intense that local authority would be powerless or indisposed to
administer justice. Further refuge could be granted if the persons were
sought for political offenses that were not crimes under local law or if
that the criminally accused would be denied
there were reason to10 believe
3
due process of law.
It is strict American policy, however, that foreign legations should not
become embroiled in political quarrels or civil war within the host
nation. 04 Where there is an outbreak of military or paramilitary action,

98. 4 G. HACKWORTH, D1GEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 622 (1941). Asylum must cease,
of course, after the emergency has ended. Id. Asylum also should not be granted to
thwart the legitimate efforts of local police in arresting criminals. See, e.g., L.
OPPENHEIMI, supra note 29, and Kirchheimer, supra note 34, at 1004.
99. W. TUNG, supra note 33, at 218. The United States has declined to sign the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum even though the Convention limited protection to
persons escaping mob violence or official persecution. See C. RONNING, DIPLOMATIC
ASYLUM 155, 156 (1965); 30 U.S. DE'T OF STATE BULL. 635 (1954).
100. C. DE VssscHER, supra note 33, at 184. See generally C. RONNING, supra note
99.
101. See H. JAcOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEXT 230-31 (rev. ed. 1968).
102. One writer counts about fifty instances of diplomatic asylum in the century
dating from the mid-1800's. Morgenstern, 'Extraterritorial'Asylum, 25 BRIT. YEARBOOK
OF INT'L L. 241 (1948).
103. Telegram from the Sec'y of State to Ambassador in Chile, supra note 93, at
584-85.
104. Local political sensitivity is a minimal factor, however, when innocent nonnationals are threatened by force. There was no question of the propriety of diplomatic
asylum afforded French and British diplomatic officers by the American consulate in
Moscow during the Russian Revolution. See Telegrams from the Consul in Russia to
the See'y of State, 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 667, 671 (Russia 1918).
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humanitarian ideals must be all but completely suppressed in favor of
neutrality. Often it is very difficult to distinguish between an insurgent
force still battling for power and political dissenters or outcasts from the
old regime. The distinction in granting asylum is crucial. Thus, when
the U.S. legation to Haiti extended asylum to a rebel general and a
handful of men during an 1875 uprising, a severe reprimand followed
from the Secretary of State for meddling in Haitian internal affairs. The
Secretary advised that mere sympathy for the rebel's plight was insufficient cause to offer refuge, since by doing so the legation gave comfort
and material advantage to the rebel forces. 105
A growing respect for national sovereignty, relative political stability
in the Western Hemisphere, and the desire wrought in part by the Cold
War to avoid charges of overseas interference in domestic affairs have
perhaps combined to bring a decline in the practical importance of
diplomatic asylum. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 106 for example, does not consider the matter 07 However, as shown
by the grant of indefinite asylum to Cardinal Mindszenty by the United
States embassy in Budapest following the 1956 Hungarian revolt, 08 the
underlying moral commitment to the protection of lives denied adequate
or fair police protection or denied safeguards of the local system of
justice remains. The policy of temporary sanctuary obtains, it should be
noted, even to the possible prejudice of diplomatic good will, 00 even
though the underpinning theory of international law invoked-suspension of sovereignty sheerly out of a unilateral humanitarian concern is certainly tenuous and subject to abuse.
2. Asylum Aboard Warships
In judging whether asylum should be granted aboard an American
warship in foreign waters, the delicate balancing of international feelings

105. Telegrams from the Sec'y of State to the American Legation in Haiti [1875],
2 FoREIGN REL. U.S. 701 (1875). The Secretary added, curiously, that having accepted
the refugees the legation should not expel them unless a guarantee was given for their
trial and safe passage out of their country if convicted. Id.
106. Done April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (1964).
107. Compare the Institute of International Law Resolutions, supra note 42,
which grant broad discretion to diplomats in granting asylum when mob violence or
official persecution threatens an individual. In armed civil strife, the threat to personal
safety must be politically inspired; and diplomats are cautioned not to allow their
missions to become bases of operations. Id. Arts. 3, 4.
108. See W. TUNG, supra note 33, at 218; H. JACOBINI, supra note 101, at 231. One
authority cites the Mindszenty case as a departure from traditional political noninvolvement and suggests that the Hungarian lack of protest was a political tactic
and not an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the American action. Kirchheimer,
supra note 34, at 1004 n. 2.
109. See Morgenstern, supra note 102, at 259-60.
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probably weighs as heavily in the decision as in questions of diplomatic
asylum. 110 The theoretical justification, on the other hand, has more
to commend itself to those granting asylum. A respectable body of
authority maintains that customary international law has elevated warships to the level of "floating islands" of their sovereign."' Accordingly,
acts occurring on board the vessel are immune from local jurisdiction;2and the right to grant asylum, even to criminals, would seem absolute."
Other authority, however, holds that immunity follows only from an
implied waiver of territorial sovereignty."13 Throughout its diplomatic
4
history, the United States has observed the latter theory"1 and has thereby
warships as in
aboard
asylum
applied the same standard in offering
legations.115 This uniformity probably owes more to State Department
circumspection regarding the judgment of naval officers in assessing
sensitive political issues than to a conscious deliberation over international law. Nonetheless, like the policy of restraint in granting diplomatic asylum, humanitarian considerations must give way to extrinsic
factors, as a practical matter.

B.

POST-WAR IMMIGRATION LAW AS ESTABLISHING

DoMEsTIc ASYLUM POLICY
The present policy regarding asylum is peculiar to the Cold War years,
an era in which the refugee is likely to be a political criminal in the land
he left by virtue of his defection alone and an unknowing propaganda asset in the land in which he seeks refuge. In years past, national quotas
110. See, e.g., Telegrams from Acting Sec'y of State to Sec'y of Navy [1912], FoREIGN
RE.. U.S. 860-61 (1912); Letter from Sec'y of State to Sec'y of Navy [1913], FOREIGN
REL. U.S. 854-55 (1913).
111. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at 853. A similar conceptual variant is the
idea that warships and naval auxiliaries are "immediately identified with the personality of the state." C. FENwICK, supra note 77, at 319. Interestingly enough, a number
of congressmen were quite firm in insisting during the defection hearings that the
deck of the Coast Guard vessel was American soil. Defection Hearings 3, 61. (Since the
defection occurred in U.S. territorial waters, the point was made only in passing.)
112. There is a split of authority whether a ship must surrender a fleeing person to
local authorities. Some maintain that diplomatic protest for failure to give up the
fugitive is the only recourse. See V. MAHAJAN, supra note 35, at 302. J. STARKE, supra
note 30, at 230-31.
113. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Chung Chi
Cheung v. King, [1939] A.C. 160; A. PAvITHRAN, supra note 30; J. WESTLAKE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw 168 (2d ed. 1910).
114. See generally 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 845-55 (1906). Asylum
has therefore been extended only at times deemed essential to the protection of
life or freedom. C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA 238-240 (4th rev.
ed. 1959).
115. Morgenstern, supra note 102, at 254-55. Other authority agrees with the propriety
of this uniform standard. A. PAvrEHRAN, supra note 30, at 255. Even an early critic
denying the propriety of diplomatic asylum as unfounded in custom conceded the
usage aboard naval vessels. A. HERmHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAw
271 (1912).
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under American immigration law were strictly maintained no matter
how great the imminent threat of danger. Immediate entry during emergencies was sometimes available on a visitor's visa, but this in turn made
admission turn upon the applicant's social and financial status.'1 0
Modern non-refoulment policy in U.S. immigration law parallels the
approach of modern international law. The earlier deportation practice
had been to allow voluntary departure to a different country if an alien
feared religious or political persecution in his homeland, but even this
policy suffered occasional abuse when the alien's politics were not to
the liking of U.S. authorities. 1 7 But this practice later bowed to nonrefoulment policy akin to Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees as a result of a still unsettled mixture of pure
humanitarianism, democratic ideology, anti-communism, and a steady
decrease in nationalist, racist sentiment."18 The change, of course, did
not take place overnight.
United States relief for those fleeing Nazi persecution actually preceded the war years themselves. From the advent of Hitler in 1933 to
mid-1942, overseas consular offices issued almost 550,000 visas to nationals
whose countries would be Axis-dominated in 1943.11 Many more were
authorized for the war years in Europe, but the prospective issuants
were unable to emigrate. Of the number issued during the war years,
practically all arrived in the United States and remained. 120 Immigration
during World 'War II, however, was extremely slack; only small percentages of each year's quota were consumed. Most of the war refugees
were natives of the Balkan states and eastern and central Europe. The
immigration quota set for this area plus Germany was only 39,000, of
which two-thirds was allocated for Germany. 121 There was a token ef116. Kirchheimer, supra note 34, at 992. A discussion of early immigration laws
regarding asylum may be found in Evans, The Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice,3 INT'L LAW 204, 207-11 (1969).
117. NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (WICKERSHIAM
COMM'N), REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE U.S. 120-23
(1931). A noted deviation from the voluntary departure policy came with the deportation of a well-known Italian Communist, Guido Servio, who was not allowed to depart

for Russia but was instead deported to fascist Italy and certain death. Id.
118. One comment on the asylum policy, while made with reference to little more
than the mechanics of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, still has vitality:
United States asylum policy is both dogmatic and pragmatic. Foreign policy
objectives, interest group pressures and counter-pressures, and the traditional
imagery of a haven for the oppressed and humiliated, intertwine and clash in a
jungle of contradictory practices, which the lucky winner extols and the losers
vilipend.
Kirchheimer, supra note 34, at 993.
119. 8 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE Bu L. 201, 203 (1943).
120. Id.
121. Truman, Immigration to the United States of Certain Displaced Persons and
Refugees in Europe, 13 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BuL. 981 (1945). Unless specially provided,
unused quotas do not cumulate under U.S. immigration law.
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fort of asylum for war refugees during the war, 122 and President Truman
made an honest attempt to reactivate the prewar visa issuance program
for eligible immigrants. But this could hardly cope with the problem of
an estimated one million Eastern European refugees in the German western zones, Austria, and Italy, who were unable to return home because
of political opinion and fear of persecution.123 President Truman, arguing that these vehement anti-communists had good cause to fear returning, urged Congress to enact special legislation which would lift the
124
quota limit on eastern European countries.
Congress responded with the Displaced Persons Act of 1948125 which
authorized the issuance of 202,000 immigration visas to eligible persons126 over a two-year period but according to a system commonly called
"mortgaging." The number of immigrant visas issued to the nationals of
any given country were deducted in advance in amounts up to one-half
of that country's normal quota for future years. 127 The cutoff date for
determining refugee status so as to qualify for emigration to the United
States was December 1945, which principally benefited bona fide war
refugees 128 in Austria, Italy, and the western zones of Germany who had
entered those countries during World War II and still remained by
1948.120
On its face, the Act was an evenhanded method of draining off a small
but measurable portion of Europe's overflow refugee migration. But
President Truman severely criticized the Act as "flagrantly discriminatory," particularly towards anti-communist Catholics who had fled incipient Soviet domination after the end of World War II and were hence

122. In June 1944 President Roosevelt had ordered the immediate entry of 1000
refugees to be chosen among those who had taken temporary refuge in southern Italy.
The President directed that the numbers selected represent the various nationalities
present. See 10 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 532 (1944).. Since this group was for the most
part qualified for admission as immigrants, President Truman later ordered that they
be granted immigrant status rather than go through the formality of deportation and
readmission. See Truman, supra note 121.
123. 17 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 137 (1947).
124. Id. at 138.
125. Ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009.
126. Id. § 3 (a), 62 Stat. 1010.
127. Id. § 3 (b)
128. Bona fide war refugees are defined as those persons under the care and concern
of the International Refugee Organization. Id. § 2(b), 62 Stat. 1009.
129. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, § 2 (c), 62 Stat. 1009, as amended, Act
of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, § 1, 64 Stat. 219. Also included were Czechs who had fled
communist persecution since the beginning of 1948. Id. § 2 (d), 62 Stat. 1010. The
Act listed three preference groups. The first two preferences were employment
oriented, while the third was aimed at relieving separated families. Id. § 6, 62 Stat.
1012. A priority was given to those who had fought against the Axis powers and were
unable or unwilling to return home because of persecution or fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion. Id. § 7.
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ineligible displaced persons.13° The President would have doubled the
number of immigrants and substituted for December 1945, a new date,
April 27, 1947, at which time the camps for displaced persons refused
further admissions, as the deadline for determining refugee emigration
rights to the United States. 13 ' A new Congress met and in some instances
exceeded the President's original recommendations. The 1950 amendment 32 to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 extended the right of
emigration deadline to January 1, 1949,133 and provided for the inclusion
of all those who had fled into refugee zones from persecution because
of race, religion, or political opinion within the group of eligible refugees.' 34 The amendment extended the operation of the program for one
year and increased the number of issuable immigration visas to a total
of 341,000.135 Thus the United States began a straightforward policy of
refuge for escapees from behind the Iron Curtain. 36
Any notion that the Displaced Persons program could keep pace with
eastern European defection was quickly shattered. East Germans were
crossing over into the Western zone at a rate up to 20,000 a month. The
refugee flow from communist countries to the south and east of East
Germany averaged about 1,000 monthly. The visa pool was virtually ex13 7
In 1952,
hausted within the authorized time limit for emigration.
additional
300,000
President Truman proposed new legislation to admit
DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 21-22 (1948).
131. 1d. at 152.
132. Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219.
133. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, § 2 (c), 62 Stat. 1009.
134. Id. § 2 (d), as amended, Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, §2, 64 Stat. 219.
135. Id. § 3 (a>, as amended, Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, § 4, 64 Stat. 221. Indefinite
mortgaging of future quotas was continued but curtailed. Quotas before 1954 could only
be mortgaged 25%; those after could be mortgaged 50% as before the 1948 Displaced
Persons Act. Id. § 3 (c), as amended, Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, § 4, 64 Stat. 223.
136. Other relief granted to Iron Curtain escapees is stated in Section 12 of the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1013, as amended, Act of June 16, 1950,
ch. 262, §10, 64 Stat. 226. The original provision authorized consulate operations in
Austria and Germany to be resumed, and directed that up to 50% of available visas
be issued to persons of German origin formerly residents in certain Iron Curtain
countries. The amendment lengthened the list of qualifying Iron Curtain countries and
authorized 54,744 immigrant visas to be issued to these fleeing refugees. The visas
were obtained first from a pooling of German and Austrian visas unused under the
terms of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act and then from the quotas of the country of
nationality. Id. § 12 (b), as amended, Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, § 10, 64 Stat. 226.
Other evidence of anti-communist influences in the amending Act appears in the
prohibition of visa issuance to any person advocating or following "the principles
of any political or economic system or philosophy directed toward the destruction of
free competitive enterprise and the revolutionary overthrow of representative governments, or to any person who is or has been a member of any organization which has
been designated by the Attorney General of the United States as a Communist
organization." Id. § 13, as amended, Act. of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, § 11, 64 Stat. 227.
137. Truman, Legislation Requested to Handle Overpopulation Problem in Western
Europe, 26 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 551, 552 (1952).

130. 19 U.S.

1971/Asylum Policy

European immigrants over a three-year period. The proposal was made
as part of the overall U.S. contribution to the resettlement of European
overpopulation 38 and was equally intended as humane action in the face
of communist tyranny overseas. 139 However, the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952,140 which contained no specialized vehicle for
continued aid to European refugees fearing or suffering persecution
soon followed. By resorting to the old national quota system of earlier
legislation, the Act eliminated all but nominal immigration from southern and eastern Europe.141
Only months later President Truman appointed a commission to study
the impact of the new legislation. 142 The President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization reported that the antagonistic policy
toward eastern Europeans was sorely at odds with foreign policy objectives in combatting world communism. 43 The Commission reiterated
President Truman's plan for admission of 300,000 escapees and displaced persons over a three-year period. 44 Unlike the President's scheme,
however, the Commission plan worked within annual quota limits and
simply accorded those seeking asylum a statutory priority. 145 Under
President Eisenhower, the program was in good part adopted with the
enactment of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953,146 which implemented the
Truman plan for non-quota immigration visas. Thus, the Refugee Re138. Section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, ch. 479, 65 Stat. 373, empowered the President to authorize an expenditure up to $100,000,000 for a U.S.
Escapee Program upon his determination that such assistance to other countries would
benefit preservation of peace in the North Atlantic area as well as the security of the
United States.
The President so determined in March 1952 and thus initiated the U.S. Escapee
Program to improve the reception and treatment of Iron Curtain defectors and to
provide for their resettlemnt. 26 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 602 (1952).
139. Id. at 551-52. Seven per cent of the visas were reserved for political and
religious refugees from eastern Europe. German refugees would receive 39% of the visas.
140. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163.
141. See 27 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 78, 79-80 (1952). The President's veto
was not strong enough to overcome congressional forces favoring the Act. After passage
the President noted that the quota for Rumania, Poland, and the Baltic states was
less than 1/25 the number of exiled refugees from those countries. Id. at 80. The
President sharply criticized the Act as requiring continuing emergency legislation for
displaced Europeans fleeing communist control. Id. at 78.
142. Exec. Order No. 10,392, 3 C.F.R. 896 (1949-1953).
143. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COIIM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 86,
at 60-61, 70.
144. Id. at 264.
145. Within the context of 1952 immigration law, a priority within the annual quota
would have been practically meaningless for eastern and central European displaced
persons and escapees since the quota for those countries was pitifully low. The Commission, on the other hand, would have abolished the national origins quota system
outright and created a unified quota pool. Immigration would be permitted on the
basis of five priorities, of which the right of asylum would have headed the list for the
first three years. Id. at 263-64.
146. Ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400.
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lief Act was not an amendment of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 but was the first piece of emergency refugee legislation to
avoid the insidious mortgaging process of earlier legislation that robbed
future generations of part of their already small immigration quotas. 1 47
The Act authorized 205,000 visas to be distributed to refugces, 14 s
escapees, 149 and German expellees. 150 These visas were to be issued almost
exclusively to Europeans; over 18,000 would go unclaimed.15 President
Eisenhower attributed the incomplete issuance to increased European
prosperity and technicalities within the 1953 Act and was worried that
the surplus would be wasted.' 52 He suggested, for example, that since
escapees rarely carried documents, the United States should waive passport requirements and the matter of security should be left to security
officers overseas. The President also advanced additional proposals, all
of which to some extent would have benefited Iron Curtain escapees.15
Congress rejected most of these and the earlier proposals of the President but did eliminate the quota mortgages completely' 54 and rejuvenated
the unused quota of over 18,000 under the expired Refugee Relief
Act.' 55 This constituted the only trace of emergency legislation for

147. The administration was most adamant on this issue. See 29 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
BULL. 859 (1953).
148. A "refugee" entitled to a visa was defined as:
...
any person in a country or area which is neither Communist nor Communistdominated, who because of persecution, fear of persecution, natural calamity or
military operations is out of his usual place of abode and unable to return thereto,
who has not firmly resettled, and who is in urgent need of assistance for the
essentials of life or for transportation.
Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400, § 2 (a>.
149. An "escapee" is any refugee who fled and cannot return to Russia, East Germany,
or Iron Curtain countries because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion. Id. § 2 (b).
150. A refugee qualifies as a "German expellee" if he is of German ethnic origin,
resides in West Germany or Austria, and was forced to leave an Iron Curtain country
or Russia (but not East Germany) in which he was born. Id. § 2 (c). Note that both
escapee and German expellee incorporate the requirement of refugee status, the most
important of which is being without settled residence.
151. See Act of September 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 15, 71 Stat. 643.
152. 32 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 951 (1955).
153. Id. These proposals included: (1) an increase by 5,000 of the immigration quota
without regard to national origin; (2) basing the immigration quota for all nations
on the 1950 rather than the 1920 census; (3) pooling unused quotas to be given to oversubscribed preferences elsewhere; and (4) elimination of mortgages created by the
1948 Displaced Persons Act and the 1950 amendment. Id. at 952.
154. Act of September 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 10, 71 Stat. 639.
155. Id. § 15. These visas were to be distributed to Middle East as well as anticommunist refugee-escapees. Id. § 15 (a) (3), (c) (1) (A), (B). The requirement of persecution or a fear of persecution was uniform, but the law made no geographic
distinction regarding anti-communist escapees. A number of refugee-escapees from
mainland China were able to benefit from this omission. See 39 U.S. DEP'T or STATE
BuLL. 507 (1958).
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escapees left on the books, and the visas authorized were virtually exhausted after a year and a half.15 6
While the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 gave refugeeescapees only a thin slice of the immigration quota, it contained another
feature of inestimable value to an extent unimagined by its drafters.
Section 212'(d) (5) authorizes the Attorney General to allow aliens to
enter the United States under emergency conditions or when such action
is in the strict public interest until the emergency ceases, at which time
the alien is returned.157 The entry, known as "parole," does not constitute "admission" into the United States' 58 but only temporary asylum.
Further, the language leaves the questions of entry and length of stay
wholly within the discretion of the Attorney General. 159
Following the Hungarian revolt of 1956, President Eisenhower invoked
section 212 (d) (5) to order the parole of 15,000 Hungarians. 60 The
Hungarian immigration quota of 6,500 was clearly insufficient if the
United States was to be in a position to grant asylum to revolutionary
escapees. 101 Convinced by the experience that the temporary asylum
privilege for Communist country escapees should be more explicitly set
out in the law, President Eisenhower then proposed that the President
be empowered to authorize the Attorney General to parole into the
United States escapees from communist tyranny selected by the Secretary of State. The Attorney General would then be given discretion to
adjust the status of these parolees to lawful residents eligible for citizenship. 162 The President later suggested setting the annual parole at 10,000,
which was thought to represent a fair moral commitment to the world
refugee problem. 163 The President put forward this and other unenacted
proposals in an effort to overhaul the entire immigration system in
1960.164
While the effort to reform the quota system failed, Congress did respond to the call for world refugee aid with the Fair Share Act of 1960.165

156. See 40 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 437-438 (1959).
157. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212 (d) (5), 66 Stat. 188.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 35 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 913 (1956).
161. 36 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 247 (1957>.
162. Id. This number was not to exceed in one year the average number of aliens
who had entered during the last eight years under the authority of emergency
legislation.
163. 41 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 215 (1959).
164. See 42 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BuL.. 659 (1960).
165. Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504. Though scheduled to terminate in two
years, the termination date was cancelled by § 6 of the Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121. The decision to continue
paroling was made because of the continued passage of refugees into western Europe.
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The Act created a matching program whereby the Attorney General was
authorized to use his parole power on behalf of up to 25 per cent of the
number of refugee-escapees resettled in foreign nations. 160 Because the
Act was meant as the United States contribution to the World Refugee
Year sponsored by the United Nations to close down European war
refugee camps, 167 the Act was politically neutral. No mention was made
of persecution or defection. The only politically tinged feature was the
requirement that refugee-escapees must apply for parole within countries
not controlled, dominated, or occupied by Communists. 0 8 Parolees
resident in the United States for two years could apply for adjustment
of status in order to become citizens.169 The Fair Share Act, having accomplished its purpose, is now effectively embodied in section 203 (a) (7),
of the Immigration and Nationality Act 1 70 which lumps refugees of

171
natural disasters and persons fleeing persecution into one category.
Persons paroled into the United States under section 203 (a) (7) are
labeled "conditional entrants" and are like parolees in most respects
except that conditional entrants have a built-in proviso for adjustment

of status.

172

Because section 203 (a) (7) has a statutory limitation of 10,200 annually, 173 section 212 (d) (5) remains the critical provision for immediate, effective asylum during world crises. That much has been clear
since the late 1950's when it enabled refugees fleeing Castro's Cuba found
refuge in Florida. Under section 212 (d) (5), over 356,000 had exited to
the mainland by 1970;174 and a voluntary airlift program 175 continues
By 1964, over 16,000 refugees had benefited by parole. 52 U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE BULL.

471 (1965).
166. "Refugee-escapee" under the Fair Share Act was defined the same as under Sec.
15 (c) (1) of the Act of September 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639.
167. See 52 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 471 (1965).
168. Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 1, 74 Stat. 504.
169. Id. § 3.
170. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 203 (a) (7), 66 Stat. 163, as
amended Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, § 3, 79 Stat. 912.
171. Id. The State Department preferred an alternative amendment of Sec. 203 (a> (7),
which would have dealt with the two groups separately. The fear was expressed that
a major natural catastrophe would seriously hinder the emigration of eastern
European refugees. Hearings on the Operation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
15 (1968).
172. Id.
173. The Administration originally fought for a limit of 17,000 annually. It believed
that this was a large enough number to guarantee "[f]lexibility in the authority of the
President to admit groups of refugees without delay .. [so] important to our foreign
policy interests." Hearingson S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 174 (1965).

174. See 47

INTERPRETER RELEAsEs

193 (1970). The total is undoubtedly greater, since

the number cited represents only those Cubans registering with American authorities.
Non-registrants were presumably paroled.
175. See 45 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 238 (1961>.
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to bring 40,000 Cuban refugees annually.T 6 Nor has relief been
limited to this hemisphere. President Kennedy authorized the use of
section 212 (d) (5) to bring over 10,000 mainland China refugees to this
country in 1962 and years followingY 77
While the numerous emergency programs for immigration and the
broad use of the Attorney General's parole power could be justified alone
on humanitarian motives, an important impetus throughout the postwar
years has been the thrust of anti-communist foreign policy. One need only
trace the history of the parole power to see that the moral commitment
to defections inspired by anti-communism has far outweighed the wavering regard to personal circumstance, which itself has run the gamut from
persecution to inconvenience. The requirement of "persecution" is
humanely overlooked or loosely evaluated so that mere escape is evidence
of a political opinion for which the escapee would be persecuted if
returned.
The asylum state, too, is rewarded by its generosity. Its liberal acceptance of persons to whom it owes only the barest moral obligation is a
honor it proudly wears 178 in contrast to the repression of the refugee's
homeland, which only increases its disgrace if it attempts to cut off the
refugee flow outward. Indeed, as shown by the Kudirka incident, the
propaganda effect of even a single well-publicized escape can be enormously valuable - or costly.

C. ALIEN

CREWMAN AND UNITED STATES NON-REFOULMENT POLICY

1. Ship Desertion as a PoliticalCrime
Imprisonment for desertion of a public vessel is certainly not so uncommon or unjust that it must, without further investigation, be labeled
barbaric. In socialist nations which rely almost entirely on public vessels
to carry on world trade, ship desertion may well be an offense as much
an injury to the national welfare as desertion from a peacetime army. In
fact, desertion from the United States Merchant Marine was punishable
by up to three months imprisonment before the law was amended in

176. Letter from Frank L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Refugee
and Migration Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Cornell InternationalLaw Journal, Feb.
23, 1971.
177. See 50 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 679 (1964); 52 U.S. DEPT OF STATE BULL.

471 (1965).

178. Testifying before a congressional committee, a State Department spokesman
emphasized the importance of granting "forceful, immediate, and adequate" asylum to
Cuban refugees in order to maintain a good image throughout South America and
Latin America. 45 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 257, 259 (1961).
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1915.179 Even a law with minimal imprisonment, on the other hand,
might be unjust if politically motivated or if applied unevenly to punish
crewmen for their political acts or beliefs. Crewmen from Iron Curtain
countries, who desert ship in United States ports, have argued with
varying success that asylum should be granted them because of preexisting political or religious persecution which they escaped or because
their defection is so infused with political opinion that any punishment
meted out by homeland officials would necessarily constitute political
persecution. Considering the number of crewmen defecting annually
from Iron Curtain ships, 8 0 the question of deportation has a fair degree
of practical importance.
Alien crewmen serving a bona fide function aboard a ship docking
at an American port, who intend to come ashore temporarily and solely
in pursuit of their calling and to leave with their ship,' 8 ' may be issued

conditional landing permits by immigration officials. 8 2 The permit
gives the crewman 29 days of valid shore leave; 8 3 if the alien willfully
overstays, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. 8 4 Congress has taken a very
dim view of alien crewmen using the conditional landing permit fraudulently to enter the United States and desert ship. 8 5 Actually, alien

179. Rev. Stat. 4596 (1875), as amended, Act of March 4, 1915, § 7, 46 U.S.C. §
701 (1964). A deserting merchant marine seaman now forfeits his personal belongings
and earned wages. Id.
180. During the five year period from 1965 to 1969, the issue of conditional permits
averaged close to 2,037,000 annually. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMmIGPRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT (1965-1969. Many of these permits, of course,
were issued to the same seamen at different times. Roughly 4850 issuants have
deserted on the average each year. Id. Complete statistical analysis for Iron Curtain
crewmen is impossible because INS figures do not give a breakdown for all nationalities. During the five-year period examined, at least 323 deserting crewmen came from
Soviet-bloc countries, with the majority from Yugoslavia. Judging from INS data, it
appears that roughly two-thirds of all Iron Curtain crewmen sailed on Soviet-bloc
ships. Id.
181. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101 (a) (15) (D) , 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (a>(15) (D) (1964).
182. Id. § 252 (a), 8 U.S.C. § 1282 (a) (1964).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 252, 8 U.S.C. § 1282 (c. (1964).
185. If an immigration officer determines that an alien is not a bona fide crewman
or that he intends to desert the ship, he may revoke the conditional landing permit,
take the crewman into custody, and require his detention aboard ship until it departs. Id. § 252 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1282(b) (1964). By making a request for asylum,
the alien crewman automatically loses his status as a bona fide crewman if he admits
that he formed the intent to jump ship before he received his conditional landing
permit. Even without an outright admission, the immigration officer will infer such
intent in the absence of convincing rebutting evidence, a finding which the courts
have rarely if ever disturbed. See United States ex reL. Feretic v. Shaughnessy, 221 F.2d
262 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955); United States ex rel. TrujilloGonzalez v. Esperdy, 186 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This technicality is particularly
vexing to aliens unfamiliar with immigration law and who are doing their best to
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deserters who come into the United States by conditional landing permits
have not "entered" in the technical sense of the word; and immigration
officials are empowered to return a deserting crewman to his ship by
authority of summary deportation methods set out in the statute, apart
from the normal deportation procedure. 186 These procedural shortcuts
187
have been justified as involving exclusion, not deportation.
Neither the statutory law nor the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) regulations took up the issue of persecution that might
be encountered if the alien were sent back to his ship until United States
ex rel. Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 8s which held that an alien crewman facing
summary deportation had a right to a hearing on a plea of possible
persecution. The INS responded by enacting a regulation which would
allow the alien crewman to obtain parole under section 212 (d) (5) if he
could demonstrate the possibility of persecution a claimant would
show under normal deportation procedure. 8 9 The Supreme Court approved this regulation in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Stanisic,190 despite the dissent's argument that the hearing granted
claimants under the new regulation lacks due process safeguards other
deportees are guaranteed.' 91 The new regulation thus incorporates the
standards of normal deportation proceedings.

cooperate honestly with immigration authorities. See Hearings Before the President's
Comm'n on Immigration and Naturalization,82d Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1952>. Immigration officials have the power to suspend deportation and adjust the status of the deportee to lawful resident in limited circumstances. Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1964). But this is denied to alien crewman who
entered the United States after June 30, 1964. Id. § 244 (f), as amended, Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1965, § 12(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(4> (Supp. V 1969). Elsewhere Congress has provided that the ship's owner or commanding officer has a duty
to report all crewmen who land illegally or desert before departure. Id. § 251 (b), (c>,
8 U.S.C. § 1281 (b, (c). It is a violation punishable by $5,000 fine for anyone knowingly to assist an alien in entering the United States by conditional landing permit
when the alien intends to violate the terms of the permit. Id. § 257, 8 U.S.C. § 1287

(1964).

186. Standard deportation proceedings are held before a special inquiry officer and
are conducted with a number of procedural safeguards. Among them are notice of the
nature of the charges against the deportee, the privilege of counsel representation
(presumably now including the right to appointed counsel>, the right to cross-examine
witnesses and present evidence, and a presumption of non-deportability. Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1964). Summary deportation of alien crewmen, following revocation of the conditional landing permit,
is authorized by § 252 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1282 (b> (1964).
187. United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967); Glavic
v. Beechie, 225 F. Supp. 24 (S.D. Tex. 1963), afrd, 340 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1964).
Contra, United States ex rel. Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
188. 188 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
189. 8 C.F.R. § 253.1 (f) (1970). The regulation, however, only benefits those who
can show a fear of communist persecution.
190. 395 U.S. 62 (1969).
191. Id. at 80-82.
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A stay of deportation may normally be obtained under section 243 (h)
of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within
the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
92
subjected to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.1

A good deal of the case law regarding alien crewmen claims under section 243 (h) has revolved around the status, yet uncertain if the existing
case law is any indication, of the punishment meted out under foreign
law for ship desertion. In the early cases, before a clear administrative
determination had been made and promulgated, the courts struggled
with a concept of an international minimum standard in assessing the
political quality of foreign law punishing desertion. Generally, the courts
agreed with the INS that desertion was not so infused with political ext0 '
pression as to put the crewman in danger of persecution if returned
Most of the early cases involved deserting Yugoslav seamen, and these
early judicial decisions as well as the rulings of the Immigration Board
of Appeals on section 243 (h) claims may be explained by a heavy reliance upon an initial determination of Yugoslav politics in 1958. In

192. 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h) (Supp. 1969). Relief is available even though an organized
government is not the persecutor, but "sporadic harassment" of one group by another
will not suffice. Matter of Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (1967). The persecutor, as well as
the persecution, must be existing and not speculative. An argument that Hong Kong
might fall from the British to the communists was dismissed as too conjectual for
relief under Sec. 243 (h). Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 386
F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1967). The current language was enacted in the 1965 Immigration
and Nationality Act. The 1952 Act had specified relief only in instances of "physical
persecution." Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 243 (h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h>
(1964). The change was in part prompted by the effort of liberal spokesmen to convince Congress that the INS too narrowly interpreted the provision and that its
decisions were not critically reviewed by the courts. Hearings on S. 500 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Judiciary Comm. 89th
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 887 (1965); Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before Subcomm. No. 1,
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 3, at 860-61 (1964).
193. In Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961), the court determined that
imprisonment for ship desertion was a "criminal sanction that is reconciliable with
generally recognized concepts of justice." Id. at 511. Accord, Diminich v. Esperdy, 299
F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 844 (1962). See also Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, 305 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1962>. The court in Zupicich v. Esperdy 319 F.2d 773 (2d
Cir. 1963), cert denied, 376 U.S. 933, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964) reached
the same conclusion. Another court ruled that punishment for ship desertion was still
a non-political crime even when the crewman feared being turned over to Yugoslav
authorities for failure to partcipate in the ship's Communist Party meetings. Blagaic
v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962). (The court also ruled that loss of employment
as a seaman would not amount to persecution.) Further resort to an international
minimum standard may be seen in Sovich v. Esperdy 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963> in
which the court rejected as the test whether the offense was a crime under a "recognized
judicial system." Id. at 28. The court noted that unlawful departure is a crime not
traditionally found in western societies and therefore may be persecution for political
opinion. Id.
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Matter of Kale 194 the INS reported that while Yugoslavia was communistcontrolled, there was religious freedom and the country had provided
asylum for Hungarian freedom fighters. Thus, fear of imprisonment
would not qualify a deserting crewman for relief under section 243 (h)
since such punishment is "cognizable . . . under generally recognized

civilized judicial systems."' 195 In a subsequent case the court all but
rendered the Kale precedent conclusive upon the issue of the persecution
in Yugoslavia, in the absence of some special circumstances. 196
More recently, there has been somewhat of a trend away from a formula
for determining persecution based upon an international minimal
standard. Instead of inquiring into the nature of the punishment, the
new approach is to characterize the penalty. In Kovac v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 9 7 section 243 (h), said the court, was intended
not for the benefit of common criminals but for those who would be
criminally punished for violating a political motivated prohibition
against defection from a police state.198 Under this decision the INS
would seem hard pressed to prove that any given Iron Curtain desertion
law was not politically motivated or that any given desertion would not
be interpreted by the home regime as a politically inspired defection.
The court in Kovac relied in part upon the Immigration Board of
Appeals decision in Matter of Janus and Janek,199 to date the most extensive exploration of the defection-political crime problem, in which
the Board observed that a law forbidding defection "normally has political, rather than criminal, connotations." 200 The test is whether the law
has "travel control" as its "prime concern." 201 Applied in isolation, persons leaving Iron Curtain countries could successfully bootstrap themselves under this test into a legitimate claim under section 243 (h) by
simply pointing to their national law penalizing overstay of an authorized
leave abroad. Therefore, the Immigration Board of Appeals in Matter
of Janus and Janek added another condition for relief under section
243 (h) : the alien must show a previous involvement in political dissent

194. Adm. Dec. A9 555 532, cited in Dombrovskis v. Esperdy, 195 F. Supp. 488, 492
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
195. Id.
196. Dombrovskis v. Esperdy, 321 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1963). The court ruled that the
single Latvian plaintiff had presented no evidence distinguishing his situation from
the Yugoslav seamen and that the court would therefore assume Kale to apply to
his circumstances as well. Id. at 467. That conclusion may be difficult to reconcile
with the fact that Latvia is a Soviet-occupied territory, unlike Yugoslavia, which is
Communist-controlled.
197. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
198. Id. at 104.
199. 12 1. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
200. Id. at 873.
201. Id.
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before entering the United States; or at the very least, he must show
20 2
that his departure was motivated by genuine political dissent.
As an attempt to reconcile the "floodgate theory," Cold War pragmatism, the legislative intent of section 243 (h), and simple humanitarianism, the Janus and Janek test reaches heroic proportions. Only the relationship between the alien and his homeland is considered relevant.
Other legal and foreign policy considerations are excluded. Nonetheless,
to the extent that section 243 (h) expresses enmity toward undemocratic
regimes, it may be improper to ignore the quasi-extradition
function
203
often inherent in the deportation of Iron Curtain defectors.
2. Extradition Law as a Harmonizing Influence Under Section 243(h)
Surrender of fugitives was historically induced by the sheer power of
the demanding sovereign from whom they had fled. That sharp retribution would be exacted by the sovereign in the form of summary, arbitrary punishment was no doubt a central factor in the growth of political
asylum. But as the system of extradition became more refined, another
principle intervened. States with liberal constitutional governments or
democratic traditions could not honestly regard revolt against a tyrannical state, however brutal, as uncategorically immoral. The feeling that
the fate of the rebel should not stand or fall with the success or failure
of the revolution took on widespread appeal. 204 The principle by which
nations refused extradition on the ground that the alleged wrong was
202. The Board said:
A person whose departure from an Iron Curtain country is devoid of political
motivation or whose decisions not to return is unrelated to the politics of that
country (e.g., the person who finds better economic opportunity here, or enters
into a marital relationship with a resident alien or United States citizen> is not
entitled to a section 243 (h) stay solely on the basis that he may face criminal
prosecution for overstay. Nor is a person who has not expressed opposition to the
political regime before departure automatically excluded from relief, if he can
show that his departure was politically motivated and that any consequences ie
faces on return are political in nature.
Id. at 876.
203. See generally Evans, Acquisition of Custody Over the International FugitiveAlternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, 40 BRIT. YEARBOOK OF
INT'L L. 77 (1964). Quasi-extradition in its many variants has sometimes been referred
to as disguised, irregular, or illegal extradition. Id. at 78 n.2. However, these terms
imply a degree of conscious cooperation. Informal extradition may have some justification when cooperation is intended and circumstances render formal extradition
procedures useless or inconvenient. Id. at 93-98. However, this is scarcely relevant
where the extraditing state openly opposes the foreign prosecution. See also Kirchheimer, supra note 34, at 997-1000.
204. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 1019-20 (2d rev. ed. 1945); Hudson, The Factor Case and Double
Criminality in Extradition, 28 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 274, 284-85 (1934); V. MAHAJAN,
supra note 35, at 297-98.
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not a wrong within the internal law of the extraditing state became
known as "double criminality." Double criminality is a term in almost
every United States extradition treaty, either by direct provision or by
2
listing extraditable crimes exhaustively. 05

One concommitant of the principle of double criminality is that a
person who is extradited may not be tried for crimes other than those
for which he was extradited or at least for crimes not listed in the extradition treaty. 206 Therefore, the United States has refused to extradite
persons charged with offenses seemingly common law crimes on their
face if the offense for which prosecution would result was sufficiently
2 07
politically related.
Two notable examples with Communist countries are worth consideration. On March 30, 1950, the American Embassy in Praha received
two notes from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs with reference to
the landing of three hijacked Czech planes carrying 85 passengers on an
airfield in the American zone of West Germany. The eight leaders were
charged by Czech authorities with kidnapping and endangering the lives
of innocent passengers. The Czechs requested extradition for criminal

trial.2 08 The American Embassy could have relied alone upon the principle of nonextradition without treaty right. But the United States went
further and rejected the request for extradition on the broader ground
that the hijacking was obviously motivated by a desire to escape and
that criminal elements of the escape plot were irrelevant to that purpose;
extradition would in effect subject political offenders to criminal prosecution. 209 Similarly, when Castro gained power in Cuba, requests for mass

205. See generally C.

HYDE,

supra note 204, at 1018. See also Wright v. Henekel, 190

US. 40, 58 (1903); Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311 (1922). In Factor v. Lauben-

heimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933), the Supreme Court declined to adopt the principle of
double criminality in an extradition proceeding, either generally as implicitly incorporated into the extradition treaty by international law or as a matter of treaty
interpretation. Significantly, the court rationalized that surrender of a fugitive charged
with a "nonpolitical offense ... generally recognized as criminal by the laws in force
within its own territories" involves no impairment of legitimate technical restrictions
upon extradition. .d. at 299.
206. See G. HACKWORTH, supra note 98, at 232-39; C. HYDE, supra note 204, at 103234. Limited exception may be made for waiver of the defendant's right, or loss of the
right if the accused lingers in the country too long after his first trial. Id. at 1033.
See also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-21 (1886).
207. For the most part, American courts have been guided by an early English
precedent laying down a standard for extradition for "political" crimes. In Re
Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, involved the extradition of a Swiss wanted for a murder
committed during an armed uprising in a Swiss district. The court had no hesitation
in deciding that the crime was political in nature since it was "incidental to and formed
a part of political disturbances." Id. at 166. According to this formula, a political
act must occur as part of a conflict between two groups battling for governmental
control.
208. 22 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 595 (1950>.
209. Id.
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extradition of Cuban defectors were made to the United States,
perhaps more for their propaganda value than anything else. Replying
to communist charges laid before the United Nations that the United
States was sheltering Cuban war criminals, the United States answered
that the Castro government had simply taken the expedient route of
labeling all escaping political dissenters war criminals and that under
the existing extradition treaty between the two countries the United
States had cooperated to the extent "consistent with its traditional legal
210
safeguards."
While American precedents on the point are few, they are amply supported by foreign case law. Thus, in 1955, Great Britain refused to extradite mutinous Polish seamen, though its treaty with Poland covered
mutinous acts, because a pre-existing fear of political persecution on the
part of the seamen colored the mutiny to make it a political offense excluded by the treaty. 21 ' At about the same time, Switzerland recognized
the political nature of escape, even in the absence of a pre-existing fear
of political persecution, when the country seeking extradition precludes
domestic opposition by means of political oppression.2 12 West Germany
has also refused extradition for a political offense when the accused was
able to prove that the prosecution was politically motivated.2 13
In Matter of Tejada214 the Board of Immigration Appeals frankly
admitted the similarity of deportation and extradition when dealing with
political refugees. Like the Secretary of State, the INS must decide
whether the state to which the accused will return has a prima facie case
against the accused. To send a person to a state in which he must face
baseless criminal charges would be to subject him to persecution. 2 15
However, when deportation and extradition proceedings conflict, the

210. 43 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 690, 695 (1960).
211. Ex parte Kolczynski, [1955] 2 Q.B. 540.
212. Judgment of Apr. 30, 1952, 78 BGE 39. This involved a reversal of the traditional stance of the Swiss that criminal acts could assume a political character only
when they were intended to bring about an internal political change. See In Re
Castioni, supra note 207.
213. Judgment of Jan. 21, 1953, 3 BGHSt. 392.
214. 10 I. & N. Dec. 435 (1964).
215. The respondent in Tejada seeking relief under section 243 (h) was the former
chief of a military intelligence unit serving under the Trujillo regime in the Dominican
Republic. The unit was more responsible for repression than intelligence, as fifty to
sixty executions took place during the respondent's tenure. The Board ruled that
persecution excluded:
• . . any governmental action taken in an orderly, judicial manner to determine
respondent's responsibility for the former activities of [the intelligence unit he
commanded], and to prescribe punishment only for acts so performed that, regardless of possible political motivation, they would constitute ordinary crimes
under any civilized juridicial system.
Id. at 437.
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deportation proceedings must cease upon a ruling of the Secretary of
State granting extradition. 216 While the Secretary might voluntarily
defer to a claim upheld under section 243 (h), the extradition order
211
has priority.
Even where repressive brutality has occurred in foreign lands, the
United States has been reluctant to allow extradition to be invoked
against the oppressors. Strict political neutrality must be observed in
order "to prevent our legal processes from being used by a foreign regime as instruments of reprisal against its domestic political opponents." 218 The willingness of the State Department to find barely
cognizable traces of political expression is especially true for incidents involving the non-extradition of refugees from an Iron Curtain country. 219
The sympathetic implementation of the non-extradition principle by the
State Department in avoiding what amounts to forcible repatriation of
those seeking asylum from Communist persecution is a policy which
might well enlighten the courts and the INS in the discharge of their
respective duties under section 243 (h).
3. Political Questions and the Burden of Proof Under Section 243(h)
An alien who applies for a stay of departation under section 243 (h)
has the burden of proving probable persecution. 220 One must sympathize
with the less than well-informed alien who must prove foreign law, its
application under near-totalitarian regimes, and the rather subjective
elements of his fear of persecution. 221 Worse yet, the alien who has
carried his burden of proof is not guaranteed relief under section

216. Matter of Jiminez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 309, at 312-13 (1963>.
217. Id.
218. In Re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
219. Cf. 34 U.S. DEP'T oF STATE BuLL. 939 (1956); S. REP. No. 14, at 6. These sources
relate efforts of Communist nations to secure the return, either voluntary or with
United States cooperation, of political escapees.
220. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 (c> (1970).
221. A Yugoslav seamen seeking a stay of deportation in Muskardin v. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1969) lost his case in part because
his expert witness had left Yugoslavia in 1940, was unfamiliar with the current administration of the law there, and could not cite cases of convictions for ship desertion. The crewman himself had never been in trouble with Yugoslav authorities and
could only plead his hatred of communism as a Catholic. See also Antolos v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 402 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1968). In Matter of Sihasale, 11
I. & N. Dec. 531 (1966), the Board said that a person seeking a stay of deportation
under Sec. 243 (h) has available:
no better method for ascertaining current political conditions abroad than does
the average person. Hence, practically speaking, [his] testimony may be the best It must, therefore, be accorded the most careful
in fact the only - evidence ....
and objective evaluation possible, in the light of acceptable official knowledge.
Id. at 532-33.
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243 (h), which authorizes, but does not require, the Attorney General
or his agent to grant a stay of deportation.
The picture on the other side of the court room is wholly different.
The INS is fully armed with information gathered by the State Department relating to the political atmosphere and governmental structure
within foreign countries. This data is supplied confidentially to the INS,
which may refuse to disclose its contents on the ground that such disclosure would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. 222
This privilege is invariably invoked regarding Iron Curtain cases; and
the information therefore does not become a part of the record. Should
an appeal be taken, factual review is all but hopeless. 223 Besides this
classified information, the INS may rely on its own experts 224 or the
willingness of the hearing officer or Immigration Board of Appeals to
take administrative notice of conditions abroad. 225
Only a few courts have been bold enough to challenge the determinations of the INS. Other courts have seized upon two tactics in upholding
administrative decisions. The 1950 National Security Act directed the
Attorney General in mandatory terms not to deport any person to any
country in which he finds that the person would suffer physical persecution. 226 Section 243 (h) changed the mandate to an authorization to
withhold deportation and referred to the "opinion" of the Attorney General rather than a "finding." Despite the paucity of legislative history, 227
many courts have had no difficulty in distinguishing an opinion from
a finding228 and characterizing the former as somehow less judicially reviewable, possibly because it is based on facts outside the record. 220
222. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 (c) (1970).
223. Arguments that this practice is irregular on the ground that the alien deportee
has no opportunity to cross-examine the replying State Department writer or discredit
his expertise have failed. Hosseinmardi v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 405
F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1968).
224. E.g., Cheng Fu Sheng v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 679
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1054 (1969).
225. Matter of Tejada, 10 1. & N. Dec. 435 (1964) (due process within the Dominican
Republic); Matter of Vardjan, 10 1. & N. Dec. 567 (1964 (penalty in Yugoslavia for
willful overstay of visitor's visa); Matter of Bukowska, 10 I. & N. Dec. 49 (1962
(status of non-members of Polish Communist Party).
226. "No alien shall be deported under any provisions of this Act to any country
in which the Attorney General shall find that such alien would be subjected to physical
persecution." Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 1010, amending
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 20, 39 Stat. 890.
227. H.R. REP. No. 5678, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) states as to Sec. 243 (h:
"The bill contains the provision in existing law to the effect that no alien shall be
deported to any country in which the Attorney General finds that he woud be subjected to physical persecution."
228. E.g., Vardjan v. Esperdy, 197 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afrd 303 F.2d 279
(2d Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
1953). See also Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963), at 31-33 (dissent).
229. See Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissent); United States
ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
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This results in confusing factual review (review of opinion of the
Attorney General regarding likelihood of persecution) with review of
the administrative standards in granting relief (review of the exercise of
discretion of the Attorney General). The two must be kept clearly distinct. Whether a crewman will suffer imprisonment if deported is a
factually reviewable matter, technically, although no doubt the greatest
respect is owed an administrative determination having the benefit of
classified information. But whether imprisonment constitutes valid
grounds for a stay of deportation is a matter of law likewise reviewable,
and the courts owe no great deference in this area to outside determinations. Nowhere in the 1952 Nationality and Immigration Act or regulations thereunder is persecution defined; and if the definition is to be
established through administrative and judicial appellate procedure,
surely the courts have a rightful place in setting the boundaries for
discretion. 280
The other judicial escape hatch has been the political question shibboleth. Relying upon Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,2 31 some courts have said that factual review, even if the courts
could compel full disclosure, would be excluded because an assessment of
political conditions abroad is a matter impinging on foreign affairs and
therefore a political question.2 2 However, as that phrase is understood
in the context of foreign affairs problems, the bare determination of
a factual issue - will the deportee be persecuted? - in no way involves
an administrative political decision, as with sovereign immunity or state
recognition problems2383 The decision to grant, or, refuse a stay of deportation because of expected persecution, nay in some indirect 2 way
insult a foreign nation - if that were ever a congressional concern 34 and only in this very broad sense might queitions arising under section
243 (h) become matters so sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs that
they must be withdrawn from the judicial arena. The exercise of judicial
review regarding persecution in cases coming within parole provisions,

230. "Administrative discretion should not be used as a cloak for a process which
exposes one to the risk of oppression without judicial review." Chi Sheng Liu v.
Holton, 297 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1961>.
231. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). "But even if courts could require full disclosure, the

very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial." Id. at

111 (dictum).
232. See note 228 supra.
233. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517, 567-73 (1966> which discusses the "access to information" rationale

of the political question doctrine solely in terms of decision-making.
234. One court found "no indication that the broadening of the Attorney General's
powers in these matters was predicated upon any political considerations, or that the
courts' review of these questions unduly obstructed the conduct of the nation's foreign
affairs." Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1961).
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however, apparently has not prompted complaints that the Executive
is being embarrassed. Nor, if the strong presidential and congressional
outburst over the Kudirka incident is any indication, is anyone ever likely
to complain when a court declares that an alien is entitled to a temporary
asylum. As a self-imposed restraint against wandering into an area of immigration law in which courts supposedly are forbidden, the political
question doctrine has been called upon more to excuse a lack of confidence than competence.
Finally, the political question doctrine calls for absolute judicial sub.
servience to the will of a political branch, a policy that would be sorely
tested by a fact situation evoking an overwhelming humanitarian im235

pulse.

IV. CONCLUSION

Asylum problems in the United State are being handled by two competing jurisdictional units within the executive branch: the State Department and the INS. While the two rarely if ever compete in any real
sense, the function each performs and the obligations each must meet
conflict to some extent. The State Department, with its job of defining
and applying foreign policy, is more sensitive to the consequences of
giving or refusing asylum. It is more likely to see the alien seeking asylum
as an object of concern and sympathy. The INS, however, regulating immigration according to a tightly knit, technically profuse statutory body
of law, does not approach asylum problems sympathetically. Virtually
every alien crewman before the INS is in the first instance a law violator
and another bad mark on its record.
Because of the complexities of immigration law, it would be unwise to
transfer all asylum problems in toto to the State Department, but certain
changes might be made to accommodate the valid foreign policy considerations, humanitarian and political, which pervade asylum.
These considerations suggest that the State Department should, either by
law or regulation, be informed of all pleas made for a stay of deportation
on the ground of expected persecution. Arrangement might also be
made by law or regulation of a certification process, by which the INS
would be bound to accept a State Department determination of either

235. See Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960). The court rejected a plea of
an extraditee convicted abroad in absentia that judicial procedures awaiting him at

home were unjust. The court held this matter a political question but added that,
under some circumstances, the extraditee "would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamination of

the principle ....

" Id. at 79.
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political conditions abroad or the probability of persecution in individual
cases or both. This would also give the State Department an opportunity
to interpret cases in light of United States obligations under the 1951
Geneva Convention. The present language of section 243 (h) conforms to
that treaty, except possibly as to burden of proof; but the administration
of the provision by the INS shows that international obligations might
be compromised. To date, in fact, the INS does not not appear to have
236
considered such treaty problems.
It may well be that the asylum problem is not well suited to the adjudicative process. 237 But in the absence of a more aggressive stance by
the State Department in demanding participation in asylum cases, the
judiciary will have to take up the slack in protecting rights guaranteed
under international and domestic law. Finally, there have been a few
glimmers of hope that the INS itself will grow a scant more attuned to
international politics in reaching its decisions. Whatever the means of
reform, it is clear that in an era of international political gamesmanship all too often suspect for its deceit and hypocrisy, the United States
cannot afford to speak with more than one clearly understood voice.

236. Research reveals the 1951 Geneva Convention being mentioned in only one
case, and there, only in passing. The court in Muskardin v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1969), held that the immigration hearing officer
had a right to consider the treaty; but he was not bound to do so. The court took the
treaty to have evidentiary value only insofar as it pointed to a liberalized congressional
attitude on asylum, Id. at 867. The court's inferential conclusion that the treaty is
not self-executing is doubtful. The convention contains frequent mandatory language
which requires no implimenting legislation. Further, the State Department took the
position that the treaty would be immediately operative. See S. REP. No. 14, at 8.
237. See Matter of Diaz, 10 I. & N. Dec. 199 (1963). Respondent feared returning
to the Dominican Republic after the ouster of Trujillo. The political facts as stated
in the record were openly ignored. The Board commented that considering the steady
shifting of events, the execution of sec. 243 (h) was more amendable to "purely administrative action." Id. at 204. Courts have made similar deference to the State
Department regarding the political content of extradition and the fairness of judicial
procedure at trial. In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 196); Gallina v.
Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
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